

CONTENTS

editorial/ <i>dev kevat</i>	3
INSURGENCIES	5
rebuilding iraq <i>anirudh baliga</i>	6
unrest in southern thailand <i>james haft</i>	11
ETHICS	19
looking through the glass walls <i>ravi dutta</i>	20
the case against euthanasia <i>alex deane</i>	25
NUCLEAR POWER AND NON-PROLIFERATION	32
background to nuclear power <i>editorial team</i>	33
background to the non-proliferation treaty <i>editorial team</i>	43
DEBATING POLICY	49
manner, culture and the rise of asian debate <i>jason jarvis</i>	50
RESULTS	59

MONASH DEBATING R e v i e w

EDITOR IN CHIEF

Dev Kevat

SUB-EDITORS

Sashi Balaraman

Ravi Dutta

Amit Golder

Maryam Jahanshahi

Tim Jeffrie

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Vice-Chancellor's Office, Monash University
Faculty of Law, Monash University
Monash Association of Debaters

Please address all correspondence to:

Monash Debating Review

PO BOX 10

Monash University

VIC 3800

Australia

Email:

monashdebatingreview@gmail.com

Website:

<http://www.monashdebaters.com/mdr>

EDITORIAL

Welcome to the 5th edition of the Monash Debating Review. We are pleased that more than a thousand copies of previous editions are now with debaters across the globe. We hope they are dog-eared and coffee-stained from hours of reading and use.

This year's volume comprises a diverse range of contributions. Singapore's Anirudh Balinga provides an overview of the elements of successful post-conflict reconstruction in his article *Lessons from History*. The Muslim insurgency in the Pattani region is then analysed in detail by James Haft of Thailand.

Former World Champion Alex Deane passionately argues *The Case Against Euthanasia*. Australia's Ravi Dutta explores the topical issue of animal rights in *Looking Through the Glass Walls*. In a thought-provoking piece, Jason Jarvis from South Korea raises the challenging issue of the cultural subjectivity of manner marking. He goes on to propose a number of possible solutions.

For the first time the editorial team has decided to research a controversial area in depth. Turn to the central pages for reviews of nuclear power and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We trust this edition will be a valuable resource for improving your debating preparation and performance. Even more importantly, we hope it will help you do what debate does best – to discuss ideas, to seek truth and to spread it.

Best wishes,

Dev Kevat
Editor-in-Chief

INSURGENCIES

MONASH
DEBATING
R e v i e w

Lessons From History

About the author: Anirudh Baliga is a graduate of Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and he holds a Bachelors Degree in Electrical and Electronic Engineering. He was a quarterfinalist and top 20 speaker at the 2005 University of Queensland Australs and was the best ESL speaker at the 2004 University of Technology Australs. He has twice been a quarterfinalist at the Asian Universities Debating Championship, and was recognized as the 6th best speaker at this year's championship conducted in May 2006.

The past 20 years have seen conflicts around the world creating an ever increasing number of failed states. Situations ranging from reconstruction efforts in Bosnia following the Dayton accords, to the current problems in Iraq, have left many asking the question – “How does one reconstruct an entire nation with its political, social and economic institutions, starting from virtually nothing?”

In answering this question, we are in a position to draw on knowledge from history, as nation building has been tried with varying degrees of success in many countries. In particular, if we are to look at the uphill battle the “Coalition of the willing” faces in Iraq today, we see that a lot of the problems they face are not new and have been dealt with in the past.

This article looks at some of the methods used in the past to solve the problems we are facing in Iraq. It is not intended to provide a concrete roadmap or a single strategy to follow in Iraq, but rather to give the reader a set of interesting ideas and examples that they might find useful in different contexts - such as in debates about counterinsurgency, postwar reconstruction, or the creation of political institutions in nascent democracies.

Rebuilding a nation in a post war situation follows a gradual progression of steps:

- Establish security on the ground
- Rebuild the infrastructure
- Create lasting political institutions.

Establishing security on the ground

The Americans seem to have tripped at the first hurdle in Iraq, failing to provide security on the ground or create an effective local police force in response to a growing insurgency.

Historically, insurgency was a common problem faced by colonial powers in the countries they occupied, and many of them became quite adept at containing this problem. It is therefore worth exploring some of the methods that they used to determine their applicability to current problems.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

The British, in dealing with the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, formed groups of local tribesmen who acted as counter insurgency operatives. They would often join the ranks of the insurgents and proceed to ambush them, or provide information to British troops as to their location. Similar methods were used by the British in Cyprus and Oman and the French in Indochina with a reasonable degree of success. The common criticism of this method is that it only worked hand in hand with excessively repressive control of the local populace by foreign troops. However, recent evidence from Sri Lanka's fight against the Tamil Tigers suggests that this method can be a useful tool on its own.

The failure of the Americans against the insurgency of the Viet Cong was attributed in large part to their inability to change the neutrality of the local population i.e. the local populace had no problem harbouring the insurgents in their midst and not reporting their activities to the US Army. Since then, changing the way in which the "host nation" views the insurgents has been a central to strategies of counter insurgency. To that end, the British employed a policy of "Normalisation" in Northern Ireland. Its central idea was to project an image of increasing prosperity and normality, where the terrorists were the only ones who didn't want peace. Millions of pounds were spent in developing housing, specially designed by counter insurgency experts so that they could be easily sealed off in the event of an incident. Community centres were built, factories seemed to appear out of nowhere, and a mass media campaign ensued.

A comparable local campaign was carried out by American Army Special Forces on the island of Basilan in the Philippines in trying to combat the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Here, American troops engaged the local community in many ways. They used discretionary funds to build mosques. They employed local workers in building local infrastructure such as hospitals, where Special Forces medics treated the local population for basic illnesses in return for information. They intentionally set up base in remote areas (usually insurgent strongholds), knowing that the roads and other supply lines that they developed for themselves would be available for use to the local population once they left. In each case, credit for successful projects was attributed to the local police and civil defence force, in an attempt to build their credibility in the eyes of the people. Despite its clear success, bureaucracy within the Pentagon seems to have prevented this type of measure from being implemented in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Psychological operations were sometimes used to turn the people against the insurgents. For instance, in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), locally recruited teams, pretending to be part of the insurgent rank and file, would openly flout local customs. Sometimes they would instigate violence against other insurgent groups, creating a situation of infighting between them. Similar strategies were also used by the Philippines Government.

A final method used to turn the people against the insurgents was by providing a monetary incentive in the form of a reward in exchange for information. Rewards for turning in guerrillas, dead or alive, have been used in many places including Malaysia, Kenya and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), with considerable success.

In Iraq today, the million dollar question remains - when will the US and its allies be in a position to end the insurgency and withdraw their troops? Regardless of the methods

used, history suggests that doing an effective job will mean that they need to stay for many more years. The most successful campaigns of nation building - in Germany, the Philippines, and Japan - have all involved the sustained maintenance of US troops for several years. The extensive stay of NATO troops in Bosnia for policing purposes exemplifies the difficulty of building a competent, self sustaining civil defence force. Premature withdrawal of troops, as in the case of Somalia, has led to chaos more often than not.

Staying for the long haul means that the 'Coalition of the willing' would do well to gather support for an International Security Assistance Force, which considerably eased the pressure on internal security forces in Afghanistan. Up to seventeen countries have contributed troops to the ISAF, allowing the division of responsibility amongst them. For example, the American and French forces are responsible for training the Afghan army, whilst the German forces train the police force. The guarantee of security has allowed aid agencies and NGOs to perform reconstruction in Kabul quite effectively. In contrast, the lack of security in Iraq has forced aid agencies to cut their staff and send them home, underlining the importance of providing security to further reconstruction efforts.

Rebuilding Infrastructure

Post war reconstruction efforts in the past have been carried out on many different scales. The largest and most prominent effort at post war reconstruction was the Marshall plan, which was targeted at rebuilding most of Western Europe. Relatively smaller reconstruction efforts were carried out in Kuwait following the first Gulf war, and in India following the Kargil war in the late 1990s.

In many successful cases, external governments provided financial support and logistical help, leaving the reconstruction efforts entirely in the hands of the local people. The Marshall plan was based on this paradigm, with individual countries executing the reconstruction projects on their own. It is significant to note that the Marshall plan went into operation only three years after the end of the war. This implies that if Europe, which was much worse off after the Second World War than Iraq is now, was able to effectively use this aid, a similar 'hands off' approach might work for Iraq. Cultural tensions in Europe at the time were arguably worse than in Iraq at present, with the Holocaust just having taken place and millions of people having been killed by neighbouring states.

Another instance of successful reconstruction directed by the local population was in the case of Lebanon. Having lasted through a civil war that lasted nearly 20 years, the country's infrastructure was in ruins. Much like the Marshall plan, they secured funding from external sources – the World Bank, the European Union, and many Arab states – and directed reconstruction efforts themselves through a central Council for Reconstruction and Development. There was a great emphasis laid on securing private investment for the reconstruction effort, which drastically reduced the responsibility of government investment. The situation in Lebanon was also similar to Iraq in that it was coming out of a prolonged period of internal social strife with ethnic tensions between groups in the country.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

In contrast, the reconstruction of Japan was carried out with active involvement from the occupying power – the United States. They took an active role in reshaping the Japanese economy and maintained a military presence in the country for five years. The situation in Japan was similar to the current situation in Iraq in that the US was attempting to set up democratic institutions in a country which was dominated by a feudalistic, militaristic regime for many years. The United States at first tried to make the Japanese economy dependent on their domestic economy. This policy was a failure and eventually reformed to allow the Japanese economy to become globally competitive.

A more advanced stage of reconstruction efforts involves active partnership between the government and civil society organisations such as local NGOs, religious institutions such as churches and mosques etc. In Sierra Leone, the Community Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project (CRRP) has actively helped the reintegration of refugees and people internally displaced by the war. It was a government initiative carried out by 100 separate government partners, mostly civil society organizations who had access to the northern and eastern parts of the country where government control was fragile. Similar efforts at reintegrating displaced people were carried out by Oxfam in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The involvement of non governmental organisations and churches in particular was crucial to reconstruction efforts in Mozambique.

As seen from the examples above, post war reconstruction is usually a long complex process requiring significant external financial support, initiative from the local populace, and active involvement of NGOs and other organization in civil society working hand in hand with the government.

Transition to democracy

The creation of lasting democratic institutions in a country that has gone through two and a half decades of a repressive military dictatorship poses a real challenge. However, countries have made this transition successfully in the past - Spain after the death of General Franco, Chile after the resignation of Pinochet, and along similar lines, Russia and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the USSR.

Spain's peaceful transition to democracy in the late 1970's provides a good case study of measures to take in such a situation. Spain was plagued with a growing economic crisis and Basque terrorism, much like the situation in Iraq today. In response to these problems, wide ranging reforms were implemented. Amnesty was granted to many political prisoners. The Moncloa Pacts of 1977 established an agreement where the major political parties in the country agreed to share both the costs and the responsibility of economic reform. The parties on the left were given incentives such as a guarantee of an increase in unemployment benefits in exchange for supporting tax increases and a limit on public expenditure. Independent trade unions were set up to replace the labour syndicates, and the right to strike was restored. The government also set up a provisional solution to demands for regional autonomy. Decrees were issued which recognized the provisional autonomy of each state. This was a symbolic gesture recognizing the unique political

character of each state, later incorporated into the constitution. A similar compromise might be a viable solution in response to the demands for Kurdish independence in Iraq.

Poland spearheaded Eastern Europe's transition into democracy; however, Polish society was relatively homogenous with no internal tension. Poland also had a well defined organised political party in Solidarity working to reconstruct the country. These factors meant that while they had significant problems in converting a centrally planned economy to a market economy, their problems were not as extensive as those in Iraq today. However, their seamless implementation of privatisation of many state-run industries might be a good model to follow in trying to restore the economy of Iraq.

South Africa's transition following the apartheid regime provides a good example of reconciliation between sections of society that were antagonistic. The African National Congress tried to portray itself as a multiracial party to ensure that it was not seen as ruling purely in the interest of the oppressed black majority. Providing amnesty to those who confessed their crimes also helped reduce tensions between the parties. Such measures might prove useful in diffusing any latent tensions between the Shias, Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq.

Each country's transition to democracy differs based on its own unique situation. The transition in the case of Iraq will need to try to create political parties, the rule of law, and other democratic institutions while taking into consideration the concerns of the different ethnic groups in the country.

The process of nation building is complex and fraught with many difficulties. However, history has shown us that most of the problems that come up have been dealt with effectively in the past, and that should provide us some hope for nations like Iraq.

Unrest in Southern Thailand

About the author: James Haft is an Associate Professor in Communications Management at Chulalongkorn University and Lecturer at the University's language institute. He has been the debate coach for the past five years. James has lived, travelled and written about the Americas, Caribbean and for the past twenty years, Asia. He has worked as a journalist, travel writer, translator, copywriter and creative director and is currently working on a book about Thai culture. James was assisted in writing the following article by Sarunsiri Srimuang, a former Vice President of Chulalongkorn University Debating Society. She debated at the 2005 and 2006 All Asian Debating Championships, reaching the Quarter-Finals this year. Sarunsiri is currently working at the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will soon commence a Master's Degree in Applied Ethics at Utrecht and Linköping.

On June 15 2006, over 50 bombs went off in three southern provinces of Thailand, Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala, killing three and injuring over forty. The well-coordinated effort was blamed on the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) Coordinate and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). This formed one of the biggest challenges to the Thai government since the insurgency began and came a day after the end of gala celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the King of Thailand's accession to the throne. Days of pageantry, culminating in the Royal Barge Procession and a state dinner for royalty from around the globe might have given the world the impression that Thailand was peaceful after months of about protests against Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and stalemate in forming a new government. Intelligence sources said some act was to be expected as separatists have named June 15 as the anniversary of their so-called 'Free Pattani State.'

A growing wave of attacks in Southern Thailand began in 2003 and forced the government to stop blaming 'bandits' and acknowledge, for the first time in decades, that separatist militants were operating in the country. On January 5, 2004, the Thai prime minister declared martial law in the most effected provinces. On November 7, 2004, the Defense Minister of Thailand said that there had been more than 700 casualties in southern Thailand since the unrest began in January. On July 19, 2005, the Thai Prime Minister enacted "emergency power decrees" in order to manage the three troubled states. Several human rights organizations and local press, however, expressed their concerns that these new powers might be used to violate civil liberties.

To quell critics, the Government established the National Reconciliation Commission to investigate southern conditions and their report was submitted a week before these latest bombings, recommending both short and long-term solutions. The first was to form an unarmed peacekeeping force and deploy it in the troubled region. For the long term, they called for a new administrative body to be set up to give the people more influence in local government decisions.

With only a caretaker government in power at the moment, however, no decision will be made. Furthermore, during the last election on April 2 which has been declared null and void, a majority of southerners chose to mark 'No Vote' on their ballots rather than vote for the governing party's candidate. Thus, everything remains uncertain in the restive south.

Historical Background

Although Malay-Muslims comprise about three per cent of Thailand's predominantly Buddhist population, they constitute a large majority in the four southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun, previously known as 'Pattani Raya' or 'Greater Pattani.' However, the outbreak of insurgency in Thailand has mostly been concentrated in three of these provinces, Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, which in former times constituted the Kingdom of 'Pattani.' Therefore, it is important to examine the historical structure of 'Pattani', which many believe to be the main obstacle to the assimilation of Malay-Muslims and even the root cause of the southern turbulence.

The history of 'Pattani' is still ambiguous, subjective and incomplete. As affirmed by many historians, 'Pattani' was historically the ancient Malay Kingdom of Langkasuka,¹ founded sometime in the first century AD and was considered one of the important commercial ports for Asian mariners. Due to its attractive location, it was sought by the major powers of the region at that time, one being the Cambodian empire of Angkor.² As a result, the Kingdom of 'Pattani' gradually replaced the ancient Kingdom of Langkasuka.

In Kedah annals (Hikayat Morong Mahawangsa), Kedah is claimed as the original home of the 'Pattani' people. However, Pattani chronicles, supported by Ibrahim Syuki, state they first founded the inland city of Kota Mahligai. In *Sejarah Kerajaan Malayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Pattani)*, Syukri suggests that the ruler of Kota Mahligai developed a small coastal village into a bustling port at the expense of his seat of power. He subsequently abandoned Kota Mahligai in favor of the new city, called 'Pattani' sometime during the fourteenth century.

Pattani's first contact with Islam was as a by-product of Arab trade with China. The Kingdom is believed to have been officially declared an Islamic state in 1457.³ The Muslim Kingdom of Pattani grew both in population and in prosperity to become one of the cradles of Islam in Southeast Asia. For the next few hundred years, Pattani was ruled by two major Muslim dynasties; the Pattani and Kelantan. The outbreak of civil war in 1729 set Pattani in chaos until an aristocrat from Dawai, Mayo unified Pattani and established himself as Sultan Mohammad. Pattani was ruled over by Sultan Mohammad until 1786 when the sultanate fell under Thai control as a vassal state.

Under Siam (the name of the Thai kingdom during this period), the Sultans and Sultanas were obliged to send *Bunga Mas* (flowers of gold) to the Siamese court as a tribute and sign of loyalty. They were also required to provide military aid when requested. Revolts against

¹ W.K. Che Man, "Moro and Malay Societies: Historical, Economic, and Social Backgrounds", *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 43.

² Andries Teeuw and David K. Wyatt, *The Story of Pattani* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 1-

³ Teeuw and Wyatt, p.75.

UNREST IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

the Siamese to restore Pattani's sovereignty occurred from time to time, even when Siamese authorities appointed Dato Pengkalan, a respected Malay leader to rule in 1808⁴. Faced with recurring rebellions, Siam decided to reduce Pattani's strength by a policy of divide and rule, which led to the division of the region into seven provinces in 1816. From the outset this policy did not promote political stability and failed to bring about effective control over revenue collection and taxation. Moreover, encouraged by the disruptions in Kedah, another vassal state of Siam, the indigenous Pattani rulers were still able to organize a revolt against Siam in 1832, which was again defeated. Over time though, the territorial division of Pattani resulted in its weakening, and it became more dependent on Bangkok, reducing the disorder in region.

As a response to threats from France and Great Britain who ruled colonies on its borders, Siam, under King Chulalongkorn (Rama V), introduced a territorial integrity policy 1899. By gradually integrating its tributary states and outer provinces into the *Thesaphiban* system, or provincial administrations, the country was able to ensure the provinces' loyalty and utilize revenues and resources more effectively.⁵ In many respects, the formal annexation of Pattani as territory to Thailand was completed in 1902. However, the King's mechanism to integrate the entire nation did not succeed in the northern Malay Peninsula. The British Colonial administration in Malaya, under the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1909, forced the King of Siam to cede sovereignty over Kedah, Kalantan, Perlis and Terengganu, or almost all the northern Malay Peninsula except Pattani, to Britain.⁶

While the British recognised Siamese sovereignty over Pattani, the Malay *Rajas* sought to unify with the other Malay regions under British rule. Even though the British refused to help, the ethnic Malay leaders of Pattani were not discouraged from opposing the centralization scheme because, under Siam, they were forced to relinquish their power over Siam's only Muslim region. With their deposition, they were still granted a fixed pension and compensation as their functions were gradually transferred to Thai bureaucrats.⁷ But as they fell under what they felt was foreign domination, Muslim secular and religious leaders formed a resistance to Thai integration efforts, but their attempts failed.⁸

During the reign of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI), the resistance movements intensified as control over Malay society increased. The most serious uprising occurred with the support of Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamarudin in Kalantan in 1922, after the Thai government tried to further integrate Muslim society by passing the Compulsory Primary Education Act which required all Malay-Muslim children to attend Thai primary schools. Once again, this

⁴ Nantawan Haemindra, "The problem of the Thai-Muslims in Four Southern Provinces of Thailand", Part 2, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 7(2):1976, p. 199.

⁵ Tej Bunnag, *Revolt in the Seven Provinces in 1902*, Thai ed. (Bangkok: Thai Wattanapanich, 1971), p. 137.

⁶ Surin Pisuwan, 'Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand', Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1982, p. 31.

⁷ Haemindra, p. 203.

⁸ Pitsuwan, p. 54-55.

policy implementation was unsuccessful. So in 1933, the territory was divided into the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. The sense of "Thainess"⁹ was then imposed to some extent when the country fell under the nationalist leader, Marshall Phiboonsongkram. During his rule, Thailand entered the Second World War as an ally of Japan, while Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin, a prominent Pattani leader allied himself with the British. So, following hostilities, there was an attempt to establish a "Greater Malay Pattani State" (Negara Melayu Patani Raya), but the British gave this movement no support. The hopes of an independent Pattani were shattered as Thailand claimed its secretive support for the Allies through the 'Serithai', the Thai free underground movement. Phiboonsongkram then continued his assimilation plan and imposed Thai-language education in the area, despite the demands for cultural autonomy.

Following World War II, the southern border provinces were filled with local Malaysian communists, who launched a long, bitter insurgency, prompting the imposition of a state of emergency from 1948 to 1960. Small bands of guerillas remained in bases along the rugged border between southern Thailand and Malaysia until a Peace Accord with the Malaysian government was signed at the end of 1989. Following this, Thai and Malaysian troops cooperated in trying to root out insurgent camps. To support themselves, the fractured Muslim separatists and shattered communist party concentrated in the region dabbled in drug trafficking to raise funds. Additionally, alienation intensified because of government misadministration, and a higher level of banditry and lawlessness evolved. Some people then began to side with the small Islamic groups, who sometimes resorted to violent tactics to make their presence felt. Some group leaders were reported to have joined the Jihad war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, returning to Thailand as extremists, or hard-line teachers.¹⁰

Despite the fact that the area served as a dumping ground for corrupt and/or incompetent civilian and military officers, the extensive Thai intelligence network coupled with military control was effective in preventing any unrest from escalating. Despite over 80% of the population remaining Muslims and some 2.6 million speaking Malay as their first language, the Thai language became the language of government and business. The Pattani Malays have, however, little sense of connection with the Malays in Malaysia and they speak a distinct local version of the language known as Yawi.¹¹

It wasn't until the shift from military control to police control and the cut of the intelligence budget when Thaksin Shinawatra became the Prime Minister in 2001 that the outbreak of insurgency began to rise once more. Surat Horachaikul in his articles *The Far South of Thailand* and *The Era of The American Empire of "9/11"* and *Thaksin's Cash and Gung-Ho Premiership*, divided the causes of violence in the South of Thailand into six main factors; the suppression for the sake of assimilation, budgetary limitation, ignorance,

⁹ Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994), p. 3.

¹⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Thailand_insurgency

¹¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Thailand_insurgency

UNREST IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

deprivation, Thai Foreign policy, and last but not least, the prime minister's style of management.

Pacifying the centuries old confrontation

Tracing back through time, it is clear that the three provinces in southern Thailand have long been a place of conflict, despite changes in government and leaders. Many policies and tactics have been employed to extinguish this problem since the establishment of Bangkok up to the present, but all have apparently failed with only brief and informal armistices before further confrontation.

The main concern now is that under the current administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the situation seems to have deteriorated, especially since the January 2004 raid on military depots. Editorials in two English language dailies, *The Nation* and *Bangkok Post*, claim that the escalation in violence is due to the government's hard-handed response to this and other actions. On the other hand, there are those in Bangkok who agree with the hawkish approach by the government, arguing that a soft response would be giving in to 'terrorism'. This became more obvious during the campaigning by member of the ruling Thai Rak Thai party during the election that brought them back to power about two years ago. To understand what each measure would do to the vulnerable south, it is beneficial to take a look in detail at the debate that has been going on. Similar issues are raised in dealing with many other insurgent movements.

Tougher law enforcement: inflaming or extinguishing the fire?

On January 16th 2005, the government issued the 2005 Executive Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations. This followed the removal of martial law which had been put into play following the January 2004 raid on the military barracks. Previous attempts to use such similar legislation (the 1914 Martial Law Act during World War I and the 1952 Public Administration in Emergency Situations Act) only temporarily pacified the region. Prime Minister Taksin justified the controversial Executive Decree on the basis that it allows for a much more rapid and effective response to 'terrorists' in the three provinces. NGOs such as Human Rights Watch refute the government's claim, arguing that it instead harms innocent locals rather than the 'terrorists'. Both views must be analysed to see whether this law should remain in force or an alternative action be implemented.

Looking at the 2005 Executive Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations in detail, we find that one of the main differences between this decree and the previous martial law is that the latter wasn't designed to cover just the three southern provinces specifically, but could cover the entire kingdom. Still, the provisions of the Decree are criticised because it grants the Prime Minister absolute power to declare a state of emergency when and wherever he chooses, censor the media and prohibit demonstrations and protests. It also guarantees immunity of all state officials and provides security forces a range of increased powers, including the ability to detain a person without arrest for prolonged periods. Initially, this was up to 60 days, but because of strong public outcries,

it was reduced to 14 days. As Human Rights Watch has noted, this is seen by many as simply another mechanism that further infuriates the already deteriorating situation of democracy in Thailand, and allows further human rights abuses.

The Thai Board of Investment has also complained that the decree has had the effect of undermining the confidence of both locals and a large number of international investors that the government hopes to attract to the country. As a consequence, rather than gaining support and cooperation from locals, the Decree has enflamed hatred toward the government for destroying the local economy and way of life with this continuous 'red alert' legislation. Government supporters point to the fact that the number of violent incidents decreased during the last few months of 2005. However this was probably due to the floods. As soon as the waters receded, the number of killings rose once more and has shown no sign of abating during the first six months of 2006.

Still, the government argues that this law is necessary for the authorities to work effectively and bring the situation under control, citing the 1952 Public Administration in Emergency Situations Act, a similar legislation during the Cold War which brought the communists to their knees. However, the success of that legislation was likely due to the government receiving support from the locals, which has not been apparent in the modern context. In summation, even with this decree, authorities are having some difficulty controlling the violence and even more difficulty in winning the hearts of the locals, which the government must do first to end the insurgency now rampant in the South.

Autonomy: a more compromising formula - giving in to the demands of 'terrorists' or the locals?

Ever since the fall of the Kingdom of Pattani to Bangkok during King Rama I's reign, the three southern provinces have had violent rebellions with many calling for self rule. All administrations, including the Taksin regime, have refused this request. Administrations have argued that to accede to this demand would be a victory for the so-called 'terrorists' and external 'troublemakers' like former Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia. It is now noteworthy that the National Reconciliation Commission, as mentioned in the introduction, is calling for a regional administrative body. Even before this, cabinet ministers responsible for the south had made such recommendations, like former Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyut. Prime Minister Taksin had him replaced with another who supported his scheme as was reported by both Thai and English newspapers.

As 90% of the population in the region are Malay Muslims, there is considerable support for declaration of an autonomous territory with its own administration governed by Sharia Law. Such Islamic law could potentially cover religious beliefs, politics, economics, banking, business or contract law, and social issues. This, locals believe, would rid them of the corrupt and oppressive officials sent from the capital as they would be replaced by their own elected civil servants who understand them better.

UNREST IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

There are those who are now trying to implement local recruitment of civil servants, including police. Unfortunately, it is likely some locals will perceive these persons puppets of Bangkok which has tried to assimilate locals into Thai Buddhist society for more than 200 years. Even partial autonomy, under which the central government will remain in control of issues such as foreign affairs and defence, leaving local administration to be governed by elected governors, is unlikely to be acceptable to all. Bangkok is reluctant to give much ground.

The simplest reason is that by doing so it would seem a vital concession to the insurgents and reveal the weakness of the Thai state by capitulating to international terrorist organizations, such as Jemah Islamiyah, whom they claim are inciting the unrest. Granting autonomy could further lead to the people calling for independence and separation just like in Kosovo of the former Yugoslavia. Thaksin is concerned not to dent his reputation as a strong character, and give an upper hand to his critics such as NGOs, academics and the Democrat opposition.

But on June 18, Prime Minister Taksin did make a turnaround when he returned full authority for security of the three southern provinces to the army, which has angered the police. It must be remembered that the military had been responsible for the region before Taksin came to power, but as a former policeman, he threw his support behind police enforcement, which caused numerous problems. They did not have an established intelligence network and have never really been able to grab control of the situation. Furthermore, the commander in chief of the Army, General Sonthi Boonyarataglin, is a Muslim himself and had already introduced a policy of assigning young Muslims drafted into the army to posts in the deep south.

One might be tempted to believe that situation in southern Thailand is hopeless. However, pertinent regional examples highlight the importance of negotiation in seemingly intractable situations. In the era of Ramos, a peace deal was struck with Muslim “rebels” in Mindanao after negotiations. With autonomy granted, the insurgents lost much of their support as most of the populace were tired of the violence and felt enough had been accomplished. More recently, in Indonesia, a peace settlement has been reached on Aceh, an island on which GAM been waging a war for independence for almost thirty years. Some attribute the December 2004 tsunami, which devastated the area, as the catalyst to the solution as the government and rebels were working to assist survivors.

Surveys and interviews by BBC Radio Thailand have shown that the people in the area do not want to be separated from Thailand for they know it would cause them hardship rather than tranquility. All they ask for is self-governance through autonomy. Now the National Reconciliation Commission is recommending such a scheme with an administrative body comprising local representatives. There hasn't yet been a response from the government, but with the army now put in charge, it does appear that the government will introduce an unarmed peace keeping force. Finally, it seems no plan will be implemented until Thailand can elect a new government, and it is feared that if Prime Minister Taksin Shinavatra remains, or regains power, the heavy handed approach exemplified by the Executive Decree will continue.

ETHICS

MONASH
DEBATING
R e v i e w

Looking through the glass walls

About the author: Ravi Dutta is currently completing a combined Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Commerce degree at Monash University, majoring in Philosophy and Economics. Ravi has represented the Monash Association of Debaters at many national and international intervarsities, including the World Debating Championships, and has adjudicated the finals of the Australasian Debating Championships. Ravi is currently the President of the Monash Association of Debaters.

“If slaughterhouses had glass walls, everyone would be a vegetarian”

- Sir Paul McCartney

Traditional capitalist theory dictates that as corporations grow, they will seek to increase their profit by reinvesting what they have earned to expand their business. This will allow them to improve the technology and the methods they use. Increasing the scale of production also results in a reduction of the cost per unit termed (economies of scale). It is under this regime that the current behemoth that is the agricultural industry has come about, specifically, the meat industry. The industry has developed to the point where vast amounts of meat are produced at very low cost, with appalling conditions for the animals in question.

Recently, however, there has been something of a consumer backlash. Consumers, concerned about the way their food is produced, have chosen to vote with their money and have driven the growth of fair trade, organic, and cruelty-free produce. This article will analyze some of the ethical issues surrounding meat, as well as going on to look at some of the other environmental issues that are created by the meat industry. The article attempts to provide the basic conceptual framework for the varying perspectives on the issue.

Ethical Issues

Most people are vaguely aware of the concept of ‘battery hens’ – egg-laying hens that are cramped in tiny cages where they can barely move, and are forced to lay eggs until exhaustion. This is just one of many examples of the horrendous conditions that animals are routinely subject to under the current standard practices of the meat industry. Chickens grown for their meat are kept in large sheds, where the birds’ droppings are left to pile up on the floor, often for a year or longer. This puts an immense amount of ammonia into the air – so much so that many birds suffer from severe respiratory problems, and even blindness¹. Chickens have been bred to grow so much meat at such an alarming pace that the rest of their bodies – especially their bones – haven’t had time to compensate. Such birds routinely suffer from serious leg problems, and even broken vertebrae which can cause paralysis. In fact, one study found that 90% of chickens that

¹ Wathes, C.M., (1998) “Aerial emissions from poultry production”, *World Poultry Science Journal* 54 pp241-251

LOOKING THROUGH THE GLASS WALLS

were being raised for meat had detectable leg problems². Distressing treatment is not just restricted to chickens – pigs are kept in pens so small they can't even turn around, and most end up exhibiting signs of serious stress and depression; veal cows are given a special diet low in iron to deliberately induce anemia; foie gras is produced by force-feeding ducks and geese until their livers expand to several times the normal size. The common practices of the meat industry are, by virtually any standard, blatantly cruel.

The argument for stronger animal rights is a fairly simple one. Most people agree that unnecessary cruelty or pain is something that should be avoided, both with humans and animals. It is for that reason that we have laws against animal cruelty in suburbia; it seems a simple step to extend this to the farms that produce the meat that we eat. This prevented partly by the costs involved, and the significant amounts of money at the disposal of the agricultural lobbies. It is worth noting that meat that is produced under stricter regimes that take into account animal welfare and well-being is often up to twice as expensive as meat that is produced in a 'factory farm'³. As a result, the current situation is one whereby the dominant methods of production result in cheap meat that is widely consumed.

However, as noted earlier, consumers are doing more to take into account factors like animal welfare when they make their purchases. It is for this reason that we see the rise of such supermarket chains as Whole Foods in America, and Macro Wholefoods in Australia. The ethical motivation is to move away from practices of overt animal cruelty, and make a moral decision with one's money to support those who promote animal welfare. Further, consumers are also motivated by health concerns, such as wishing to avoid the antibiotics that are fed to the animals during their rearing. This makes sound economic sense as well – by buying goods that are cruelty-free, it sends a signal to the producers that this is what consumers want. It is hoped that through actions like these, animal cruelty will be eventually eliminated.

This position is not necessarily as defensible as it first seems. The concern for animal rights is admirable, as is the aim to prevent cruelty. However, it seems almost contradictory to on the one hand concede that animals have a right to be free from cruelty and suffering, but then on the other still consume meat, thus obviating arguably the most important right – the right to life. Surely if animals have any right at all, it is the right to continue living, as well as having the right to be free from cruelty. From this perspective, the most defensible position is then to become a vegetarian, or even a vegan. The argument for veganism – not consuming meat, or any meat products – is simply that all forms of farming involve exploitation and cruelty of animals, and thus any consumption of animal products supports this. Furthermore, such consumption is unnecessary, as nutrition can be gained from other natural foods, or through vitamin supplements in some specific cases. However, applying the earlier logic of avoiding undue pain and suffering, it seems to be quite ethically acceptable to consume animal products such as milk and eggs –

² Davis, K., (1996) *Prisoned chickens, poisoned eggs: An Inside Look at the Modern Poultry Industry* Summertown: Book publishing company

³ Singer, P., and Mason, J., (2006) *The Ethics of What We Eat*, Melbourne: Text Publishing Company

if and only if the animals are raised in an environment that is cruelty-free and takes into account their well-being.

Of course, these arguments are predicated on a certain valuation of animal rights. One can value animal rights, but can argue that the rights of humans trump them. Indeed, even the staunchest meat-eater may agree that cruelty to animals should, as much as possible, be avoided. Even those who take a religious view – that man is inherently superior, and has dominion over the land and its creatures – would probably argue that our superior status confers a responsibility to treat animals with some decency⁴. However, these proponents do still hold that the human need and desire for meat is significant enough to trump the animal's right to life.

This of course leads to a separate issue – whether or not humans can survive without meat. The millions of vegetarians that live throughout the world – and some religions and cultures that have survived for centuries without eating meat – indicates that humans can probably live without meat if it was really necessary. However, meat is important for certain key vitamins and minerals, such as iron, and whilst these can be obtained from other sources, meat is often necessary and highly recommended for certain diets, such as pregnant women and growing children.

Accepting that meat is necessary for certain diets means that one can make a more morally defensible position for eating meat. A person can accept the right of animals to be free from cruelty, but insist that their own right to nutrition trumps this, thus justifying the eating of meat. Again, this depends partly on the valuation that a person places on animal rights, in comparison to other rights of humans.

Cultural Issues

Another aspect of this issue is that in most cultures, meat is an integral part. The great Aussie barbeque, the American porterhouse steak, the British bangers and mash – all are significant parts of their respective cultures, and they play a significant role in defining and shaping the cultures. For many people, meat is tied in to their culture, and represents a connection with their culture or their family – food is a central part of our lives, and coming together to eat food as a group or as a family is as old as humanity itself. Meat often plays an important role in this process.

Culture is not necessarily the best defense for a social practice – just because something has been done a certain way, it does not mean it is necessarily right, and no doubt the reader can think of many examples of social practices that were abolished for ethical considerations. However, given that meat does have some positive outcomes, it does add something to that side of the ledger in terms of adding benefits which may then be of greater weight than the rights of animals. Further, the fact that meat is so ingrained in so many of our cultures indicates that the complete abolition of meat is not likely to occur anytime soon. With such a heavy focus on meat in society, any overt attempts to abolish it

⁴ Linzey, A., (1994) *Animal theology*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press

LOOKING THROUGH THE GLASS WALLS

would more than likely mobilize parties to safeguard something that is seen as integral to society, and would likely further ingrain the culture of eating meat. For those who would seek to abolish meat completely, the best method would seem to be to firstly eliminate cruelty and gain an acceptance of animal rights, and then move to eliminating meat entirely. Whether the jump can be made from eliminating cruelty to eliminating meat altogether is, of course, debatable.

Environmental Issues

Like other industries, the meat industry has a significant environmental impact on the world. Firstly, current 'factory farm' practices can be severely damaging to the environment. The concentration of a large number of animals producing large amounts of waste in a small area can mean that waste often contaminates the surrounding environment. For example, Chesapeake Bay in the United States was once brimming with marine life. Now, however, there are significant 'dead zones' – areas where marine life has ceased to grow. This is largely attributed to the nearby chicken farms on the Delmarva Peninsula – the waste, when it is collected, is spread on the fields surrounding the farms. However, far more waste is produced than can be safely absorbed by the surrounding fields. As a result, the excess is washed off by rain and ends up in streams and waterways⁵. This phenomenon is prevalent at many farms where animals are grown – there is almost always far more waste than can be safely disposed of, resulting in run-off that contaminates local waterways. Also, this waste leads to a significant detraction in the local air quality – studies have shown that often those living near pig farms have higher stress levels and poorer health, as the smell is often very powerful and spreads a great distance⁶. These sorts of costs – or externalities, as they are known in economics – are not accounted for in the costs of producing meat, and are often ignored.

A second and often somewhat ignored point is that significant amounts of agricultural resources go into raising the animals themselves, in terms of producing grain and feed for the animals, as well as the amount of water consumed. Estimates vary for different animals, but it takes at three times as much grain to produce one kilogram of meat, and in some cases the figure can be as high as ten or thirteen times⁷. It is questionable whether this grain could be used to 'feed the starving children', however – most of the grain is not suitable for human consumption anyway, and is often produced on land that wouldn't yield high enough quality grain for human consumption. However, these are still inputs that are quite inefficient, and whilst much of the land is not suitable for producing food able to be consumed by humans, at least some of it is. Indeed, the environmental costs of producing and transporting the grain must also be factored into the equation. Further, one

⁵ Goodman, P., (1999) "By-Product: Run-off and Pollution", *Washington Post*, August 1

⁶ Bullers, S., (2005) "Environmental stressors, perceived control, and health: the case of residents near large-scale hog farms in eastern North Carolina." *Human Ecology: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 33.1 Feb

⁷ Singer, P., and Mason, J., (2006) *The Ethics of What We Eat*, Melbourne: Text Publishing Company

of the more amusing problems is that animals – cows especially – give off a significant amount of methane, which contributes to global warming in its own way.

Conclusions

Although vegetarianism is on the rise, the vast majority of the world's population consumes some amount of meat – this author particularly enjoys his chicken – and it is a state of affairs that is not likely to change anytime soon. The problem is that the act of eating meat is completely disconnected from the fact that it has come from a living animal, and the way in which that animal was treated. This results in a somewhat sanitized notion of what meat is, devoid of the reality of the context of the animal's cruel life and death.

However, if we are to consider ourselves rational, intelligent beings, then it is important that we at least confront and question concepts that we take for granted. There are issues about the way in which we eat meat, and the way in which our society implicitly condones some actions that, when we are forced to focus on them, we all would agree are abhorrent. The walls may not be made of glass, but that does not mean we cannot take a look inside.

References:

- Bullers, S., (2005) "Environmental stressors, perceived control, and health: the case of residents near large-scale hog farms in eastern North Carolina." *Human Ecology: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 33.1 Feb
- Davis, K., (1996) *Prisoned chickens, poisoned eggs: An Inside Look at the Modern Poultry Industry* Summertown: Book publishing company
- Goodman, P., (1999) "By-Product: Run-off and Pollution", *Washington Post*, August 1
- Linzey, A., (1994) *Animal theology*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press
- Singer, P., and Mason, J., (2006) *The Ethics of What We Eat*, Melbourne: Text Publishing Company
- Wathes, C.M., (1998) "Aerial emissions from poultry production", *World Poultry Science Journal* 54, pp241-251

VISIT THE MDR ONLINE

read articles from previous editions
view supplementary articles and updates
purchase MDRs using our secure "Paypal" system
access our back catalogue
give us your feedback, results and comments



<http://www.monashdebatingreview.com>

The Case Against Euthanasia

About the author: Alexander Deane won the World Universities Debating Championships 2004 in Singapore for Middle Temple and is Deputy Chief Adjudicator at Vancouver Worlds 2007. He has coached and taught debating for ten years, in a number of countries. After an undergraduate degree at Cambridge University, he took a Masters in International Relations at Griffith University, Queensland as a Rotary Scholar. Former Chief of Staff to David Cameron MP, now leader of the Conservative Party in the UK, he is the author of "The Great Abdication: Why Britain's Decline is the Fault of the Middle Class" (2005) and Off With Their Wigs! Legal Revolution In Modern Britain" (2003). He is a trainee barrister and lives in London.

Because public debate about the 'right to die' is always prompted by undeniably tragic high-profile cases, those of us who oppose euthanasia are usually on the back foot. We let those who favour the legalisation of euthanasia frame the discussion in terms that are very favourable to their position – terms that avoid the reality of an environment in which the deliberate ending of life would be part of the medical apparatus.

The debate about euthanasia isn't about 'letting people die' – it is about doctors actively taking part in killing them. To ask if euthanasia should be legalised is therefore not merely to ask whether a 'right to die' exists in moral terms. Proponents of euthanasia are also asking the state to take part, through its laws and its representatives, in the actual termination of life.

The state and society are therefore entitled to a moral stance, and to weigh up the importance of those things that undoubtedly support the case for euthanasia – such as human dignity and relief from suffering – against the importance of preserving life and the clarity of a 'bright line' rule on this most fundamental issue.

In order to protect all of us, I believe that the state must say that whilst there is a right to life, there is no right to death. People die, but the state should not kill them. In a euthanasia society, the state is asked to make decisions about whose life should continue, and whose should not – to draw up criteria, perhaps. As articulated by the House of Lords – directly or indirectly, the state should never say, should never be able to say, that a person's life is not worth living:

The message which society sends to vulnerable and disadvantaged people should not, however obliquely, encourage them to seek death, and instead, should assure them of our care and support in life¹.

Great dangers might follow any relaxation of the strict rule against medical killing; changing the law encourages more change. Pro-euthanasia campaigners argue that an

¹ <http://www.bopcris.ac.uk/bopall/ref24522.html>

THE CASE AGAINST EUTHANASIA

absurd contradiction exists under the status quo: that individuals able to reach for the pill bottle can engineer their 'exit,' but those who are not able to, cannot: the current law, they say, penalises those who are most impeded. Ensuring that the latter can die at will as the former can is but a small change. It equalises the positions of those whose situations are substantially the same but have radically different options due to an unfeeling law, they say.

In a euthanasia environment, with living wills in place as most campaigners recommend, another argument will be advanced along the same lines. The families of those who had the foresight to sign such a document can ensure their loved one's undignified suffering in a coma can be ended, they say, whilst the families of those who did not have such foresight cannot. It is a small change to allow the latter the same freedom as the former, they'll say. It equalises the positions of those whose situations are substantially the same but have radically different options due to an unfeeling law, they'll say. And so we would move from a voluntary euthanasia environment to an involuntary euthanasia environment.

It is for this reason that in February 1994, after lengthy investigation, the House of Lords Medical Select Committee (the membership of which included some previously pro-euthanasia Lords) held unanimously that euthanasia should not be considered in the UK, they stated that:

Creating an exception to the general prohibition on intentional killing would open the way to further erosion, whether by design, by inadvertence or by the human tendency to test the limits of any regulation. These dangers are such that any decriminalisation of voluntary euthanasia would give rise to more, and more grave, problems than those it sought to address.²

This continues to be the position held by the British Government.³

The Medical Profession

Certainty in medical practice is tremendously important. The aim of medicine is to help people get better – to preserve life, not end it. That is why people become doctors. At the heart of medicine lies a pledge called the Hippocratic Oath, which (whilst precise wording varies) says 'I will give no deadly medicine to anyone, even if asked, nor suggest any such course.' Euthanasia's proponents play down its importance, but it doesn't matter whether doctors actually stand up and swear this oath or not – our understanding of medicine is shaped by it. That fundamental contract between society and medicine would be broken by euthanasia.

It is true that doctors also have a duty to uphold the dignity of their patients. But the principle of medicine, its fundamental aim, is to heal. If it comes down to life versus dignity, life must win – because that way, doctors are violating the lesser duty, the lesser

² <http://www.bopcris.ac.uk/bopall/ref24522.html>

³ <http://www.dca.gov.uk/menincap/ch2.htm>

principle. If they are making a mistake, the mistake is lesser in preserving life than the potential mistakes involved in ending it to preserve dignity.

On a different note, there is a reason the British Medical Association recommends maintaining the current anti-euthanasia environment. In a euthanasia environment, as euthanasia cases become more and more common, some doctors who don't want to perform this procedure for whatever reason will be pressured to do so. Their careers will suffer as a result. Furthermore, even doctors who are not among those directly concerned, who neither euthanize nor are asked to, are nevertheless affected: doctors have taken up their vocation specifically because of their desire to cure and preserve life. This changes the nature of their profession. It casts the confusion of healer or killer across whole of medicine.

Doctors of faith are put in a terrible position where euthanasia is legal. Even if they do not have to confront this directly, even if they are never asked, the profession they belong to is doing something they believe is profoundly wrong. Because it reflects on all doctors, once some doctors start killing their patients. It erodes doctor-patient trust, and fundamentally changes the doctor-patient relationship. Patients, especially the elderly, will ask with justification, 'need I fear going to the doctor, for he may prescribe death?'

We are often told in response to this that 'doctors are doing this already' and that this change merely makes their actions safer for them and the patient. But are they? They should not be. They are breaking the law, which they are bound to obey just like anyone else. They should be prosecuted. The fact that the law is broken is no justification for changing it. In truth, this is no argument in favour of euthanasia at all. Even if it is true that some doctors really are killing their patients, and in doing are doing what they and all in the case concerned believe to be best, at least the state is not currently implicated in that act.

The Impossibility of Certainty

Medicine is always improving. Cures are found, and better techniques are developed. Euthanasia stops the chance of benefiting from new developments and from unexpected improvements, because it ends the life that might have had that benefit.

Furthermore, all medical conditions ebb and flow. Medicine frequently sees remissions that are entirely unexpected. They sometimes come in patients told definitively, certainly, that they have no chance of surviving their condition.

No certainty exists in medicine, for these two reasons. But the voice of the 'expert' is one of great and misleading allure. Because of the rapidly changing nature of medicine, a doctor or team of doctors may wrongly say – with certainty – that a patient will die. But patients have a disproportionately high trust of doctors, because of the tremendously esteem in which the profession is held. In a euthanasia society, that certainty – where in truth things can never be certain – may lead to avoidable death by ill-informed 'choice.'

THE CASE AGAINST EUTHANASIA

The doctor or doctors might also simply have misdiagnosed, or be incompetent. Even if he has done neither, he may nevertheless be wrong.

It will be the doctor's values and judgements about pain, disability and dependence that will determine what is recommended and what is done. Since those values will be randomly met, that would be profoundly unjust.⁴

Pro-euthanasia advocates seek to avoid this issue by shifting responsibility onto the patient, who ostensibly wants to choose death – if the individual wants it, they say, and we can guarantee that they are rational, who are we to deny them?

The truth is that even if the patient is held to be 'rational,' if his health is so bad as to warrant the consideration of euthanasia then his condition invariably precludes real judgment. You are asking people about their view of the future at the worst moment – at their very lowest point, the moment at which their condition is most severe. In Australia in 1996, during a brief period of legality in the Northern Territory, Dr. Philip Nitschke was the first doctor in the world to give legal, voluntary euthanasia. After the law was changed, his supporters campaigned vigorously for a return to euthanasia. His poster patient June Burns made a tremendously powerful appeal, pleading for death on national TV in 1999, saying she would rather kill herself than "die like a dog" from cancer. She went into remission a year later, and (whilst still pro-euthanasia) she is naturally glad that she was not allowed to make that choice, at the moment when she was at her worst.

The patient might still be rational, but he or she is rational in circumstances so extraordinary as to make his or her choice an impossibly ill-informed one. The patient is not making truly informed choices because medicine does not know with certainty everything that will happen in the future. The patient is rational – but is making this decision only with the information available, in the circumstance of most pain and suffering, when things look worst. He or she thinks that their options are binary – terrible pain, or death – when there may be palliative treatments and better treatments to alleviate suffering and facilitate a rewarding end to life even if death itself is inevitable. They make a decision they will not live to regret.

It is uncertain as to whether there is a point at which there can be an informed and rational choice at all, even for those patients whose plight has been identified with what the medical world believes to be certainty. To stop pain, the patient is often on powerful mind-altering, drugs. This 'consent' can't be considered valid in those circumstances. So the patient is taken off the drugs to be asked the choice. The patient is now in tremendous amounts of pain, and in withdrawal from drugs which are often addictive, so unsurprisingly, when someone asks if he or she wants the pain to stop, the answer is yes.

Supporters of euthanasia attempt to circumvent these problems by supporting 'living wills.' But quality of life is context specific. You or I may say I never want to be trapped in my body, unable to move. But we do not really know how we will actually feel in that

⁴ 'When Death is Sought,' *New York State Task Force on Life and the Law*, accessed at <http://www.dca.gov.uk/menincap/ch2.htm>

situation. There are those alive today who communicate through the blinking of an eye, the movement of a finger, and say I want to live. I would not have thought that I would, but I do. I can enjoy seeing my family around me, my children grow up, my parents smile: this life has its rewards that more than compensate for what I would once have thought unbearable.

Pre-judgement of one's attitude of quality of life is totally irrelevant until you experience it, and no-one else can make that decision for you. To say "x condition is too horrible to endure" is to apply objective criteria to conditions that are utterly subjective.

Potential for abuse

All the oft-claimed checks might be in place for the first few high profile euthanasia cases, but in an environment in which euthanasia is an everyday occurrence, where euthanized death is not controversial but banal, the following may occur:

Families may urge doctors to 'let their loved ones go' – nobody should ever be able to hold that sway over the lives of others, but in a euthanasia environment they do.

Families that stand to gain from the death of the patient may bribe or collude with doctors to agree that this person should die.

Doctors will face enormous pressure. The need for beds and for precious resources will be apparent. Society will effectively be asking doctors to make value judgements in a system with finite resources – whose life is worth living, whose is not? Presently, they do not have ability to cut down one life to make space for another – or if they do, by breaking the law, they should not. Yes, abuse might happen now – but under which system is it more likely?

The point is that in determining public policy, one cannot rely on ideal cases, where all terminally ill patients are treated at the highest standards and all doctors are well informed and competent in terminal care.

Euthanasia offers an 'easy way out' – which might be thought better than months of treatment. Said treatment is probably – no, certainly – in the best interests of the patient, who gets to live – but often not in best interests of the family, who do not want the suffering and the difficulty of having to watch.

In medicine at the moment, the interests of the patient are the key, no matter what others want. More than that – they are the sole determinant. In effect, euthanasia balances the interests of the patient against the interests of others. The dangers to the patient are obvious.

Euthanasia is sometimes presented as something the conservative should support: that it is a facet of liberty, a question of control over one's own body and what happens to it. Not so. In a euthanizing environment, if a healthy person, entitled to medical treatment,

THE CASE AGAINST EUTHANASIA

of sound mind, came to a doctor and said 'help me die,' the doctor would not. So euthanasia is not actually about the individual's rights and control over their body. Bodily autonomy is a red herring in this debate.

Relief is obviously tremendously important: of course, people should not suffer unnecessarily. Palliative care is getting better and better. Social care at the bedside, anti-depression techniques, pain management – these are all improving and should be pursued with great effort. But we must not legalise euthanasia.

NUCLEAR POWER & NON-PROLIFERATION

MONASH
DEBATING
Review

BACKGROUND TO NUCLEAR POWER

Nuclear power is an emotive and controversial issue. Some people are attracted to the notion of releasing vast amounts of energy from a single atom rather than burning fossil fuels. Others are fearful, perhaps haunted by images of the Chernobyl disaster. There are more than 440 nuclear power plants worldwide.¹ However, many are aging – in the UK nine of twelve plants are likely to be shut down by 2020.² The possibility of new plants being built is already causing controversy. In the developing world countries such as India are turning to nuclear energy to meet growing energy demands. The nuclear debate is inescapable.

This article reviews some of the major issues and arguments in the debate. It also aims to equip the reader with facts and examples to illustrate their points. A discussion of the challenge of increasing world energy demands is followed by a detailed exploration of major renewable energy sources. Attention is then turned to the economic, environmental and political aspects of nuclear power itself.

World energy demand – Is there a need for nuclear power?

The United Nations predicts that the world population will grow from approximately 6.5 billion in 2006 to 7.9 billion by the year 2025.³ 90% of this population growth will occur in the developing world. Demand for power is predicted to grow at 1.7%⁴ annually, resulting in a 50% increase in world power requirements by 2025.⁵ Importantly, it is the developing world nations such as China and India which will have the greatest need for more power. For example, Asian power demand has been growing by 4.5% per annum compared with 1% for North America.⁶ By 2025, approximately half of the world's power will be consumed in developing nations. These facts allow a debate about nuclear power to be centred in the developing world if so desired. With some basic knowledge about development, it can be argued that meeting this energy demand is vital for poverty alleviation.

¹ International Atomic Energy Agency accessed at <http://www.iaea.org/cgi-bin/db.page.pl/pris.reaopag.htm>.

² Joan MacNaughton, Director-General of energy policy at the British Department of Productivity, Energy and Industry quoted in *The Observer* 8/5/05.

³ United Nations forecast from World Population Prospects Database (2004 revision) accessible at <http://esa.un.org/unpp/>.

⁴ International Energy Agency report: *World Energy Outlook* 2004.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *British Petroleum Review of World Energy* 2002.

In 2002, petroleum contributed 38% of the world's energy (but only 8% of electricity generation), coal 24% (39% of electricity generation), natural gas 24% (18%), nuclear power 7% (17%) and renewables such as hydropower, solar and wind energy 7% (18%).⁷

A key issue early in the debate is likely to be a discussion of the options available to meet the world's growing energy demand. The affirmative/proposition can claim that nuclear energy is a necessary part of meeting increased requirements. Alternatives such as solar and wind power could be claimed as part of the affirmative proposal, with the caveat that it must be argued that these measures are not enough to meet increased demand by themselves. The temptation to usurp the negative side's matter must be weighed against the disadvantage of blurring the lines of the debate and possibly appearing weak. Care must be taken to keep focused on the crux of the affirmative burden – proving the necessity and benefits of nuclear power.

There are three broad categories of possible sources of power: fossil fuels (including oil, coal and gas), nuclear power and renewables (including hydro and solar power). Most scientists believe that fossil fuels are a finite resource. Great controversy exists as to when reserves will run out. Hubbert correctly predicted⁸ that US oil production would peak around 1970 but incorrectly estimated global production would peak in 1995. Some experts say that we are currently close to or have just passed the oil production peak. The IEA notes that production is in decline 33 of the 48 largest oil producing countries. However, United States Geological Survey (USGA) currently estimates that there are enough petroleum reserves to continue current production rates for 50 to 100 years. OPEC estimates it has enough reserves for 90 years *at current usage rates* but predicts it will nearly double output by 2025. Natural gas production is expected to peak around 2030, and are predicted to last reserves will last until 2085. Known coal reserves would last 150 to 300 years at current production rates.⁹

Sides opposing nuclear power may benefit from pointing out the long list of pessimistic forecasts which have failed to pass. These include two previous reports from the USGA that predicted oil supply would be exhausted before 1980. Maugeri points out that the recovery rate from oil fields has improved from 22% in 1980 to 35% today,¹⁰ highlighting the importance of constantly evolving technology. Furthermore, almost all estimates exclude substantial non-conventional oil sources such as tar sands (largest reserves in Canada and Venezuela); oil shale (reserves in United States, Australia Estonia, Russia, Brazil, and China). Relatively abundant sources of coal can also be converted to oil if needed. Continued oil prices of greater than US\$40 a barrel would make these options

⁷International Energy Association, *International Energy Annual 2003* (Table 29 and Figure 13).

⁸ Hubbert, M.K. (1956). 'Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels' Presented before the Spring Meeting of the Southern District, American Petroleum Institute, Plaza Hotel, San Antonio, Texas, March 7-8-9, 1956

⁹ *British Petroleum Annual Report 2005* and US Energy Information Administration, *Annual Energy Outlook 2004*.

¹⁰ Maugeri, L. (2004). 'Oil: Never Cry Wolf-Why the Petroleum Age Is Far from over.' *Science* 304, p 1114-1115.

BACKGROUND TO NUCLEAR POWER

economically attractive for energy companies. A negative/opposition side could devastate an unwary foe by asking how long uranium reserves would last compared to coal reserves (at current production rates and technology). The answer is 50 to 70 years¹¹ compared to 200 to 300 years.

Renewable energy sources

It will be negative/opposition sides which will be arguing most strongly for widespread adoption of renewable sources of energy rather than usage of nuclear technology. This section focuses on solar, wind and hydropower. Geothermal and biofuels are also possible energy sources. Alternatives can be promoted as an adjunct to and/or eventual replacement for fossil fuel use. Many alternative sources of energy are not mature technologies nor have they benefited from the same level of government support (such as subsidies and tax incentives) as fossil and nuclear fuels. Germany is an exception – incentives are offered for wind and solar power. The German Renewable Energy Law (EEG), originally passed in 2000, forces energy companies to buy from renewable sources even if they are more expensive. More than 10% of Germany's energy now comes from renewable sources.

Hydroelectric power has been lauded by many energy experts as the most flexible and efficient forms of alternative energy.¹² The process for generating hydroelectric power is relatively simple, the kinetic energy freed by falling water drives turbines which converts the water's motion into mechanical and electrical energy.¹³ Hydroelectric power is seen by some as an answer to the world's increasing dependence on fossil fuels to generate energy. According to the IEA hydroelectric power contributes 16% of the world electricity production at a production value has been estimated to exceed seventy-five billion US dollars per annum.¹⁴ There are a number of benefits that are espoused in relation to hydroelectric power, the primary one is that this source of energy emits significantly less carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere, and thus is an environmentally friendly form of renewable energy. Secondly, in assessing the efficacy of hydroelectric power supporters claim that hydropower can provide the base-level needs of the population, that is the constant need of consumers as opposed to changes in need during peak time.¹⁵ The reason for this is because hydroelectricity has a constant source of power, especially from

¹¹ Australian Uranium Information Centre, 'Supply of Uranium, Briefing Paper #75' 2006. Note that more uranium could be extracted if the market supported increased production costs. It is even possible to extract uranium from seawater.

¹² Alison Bartle, 'Hydropower Potential and Development Activities', *Energy Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2002, pp. 1231/1239; and, Frans Koch, 'Hydropower: the politics of water and energy: Introduction and Overview', *Energy Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2002, pp. 1207-1213.

¹³ Dominique Egré and Joseph C. Milewski, 'The Diversity of Hydropower Projects', *Energy Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2002, pp. 1225-1230, p. 1225.

¹⁴ Frans Koch, 'Hydropower: the politics of water and energy: Introduction and Overview', *Energy Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2002, pp. 1207-1213, p. 1208.

¹⁵ Dominique Egré and Joseph C. Milewski, 'The Diversity of Hydropower Projects', *Energy Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2002, pp. 1225-1230, p. 1225.

reservoir-type power stations that dam large bodies of water and control the flow of that water to produce a stable level of energy.¹⁶ Alternatively, hydroelectric power can be essential in covering peak periods, hydropower has a significant advantage over other energy sources as it can be turned on and deliver energy in minutes.¹⁷ The proficiency of hydropower can be seen in Asia where nine countries rely on hydropower for over half of their energy, furthermore, China's massive investment in the Three Gorges project will reportedly provide China with one-fifth its total energy needs.¹⁸

Having outlined the positives, hydroelectric energy has some significant difficulties associated with greenhouse gas emissions and the environmental degradation associated with the establishment of dams. In a recent study by Philip Fearnside on the Curuá -Una Dam in Brazil, he found that the greenhouse effect of the emissions from the dam was more than three-and-a-half times what would have been produced by generating the same amount of energy by burning oil.¹⁹ The reason for such a large amount of emissions is that dams often cause flooding in related areas, as such decay from above water biomass such as trees which emit methane, a gas that has twenty-one times more impact than carbon dioxide on global warming.²⁰ Secondly, the socio-environmental impact of hydroelectric power is well-known. Damming major rivers, such as the Yangtze in China, may displace millions of people and destroy fish stocks forcing those in surrounding areas to look for work or move as well. More than one million people were displaced from the Three Gorges project in China, yet the response from many supporters is that 'best practice' should be used in establishing these dams. The problem is that countries that are attempting to gain access to hydropower may not have the ability to engage in 'best practice' behaviour and thus there are still remaining environmental issues.

Like hydroelectric power, wind energy is a simple alternative energy process - air flows past the rotor of a wind turbine, which in turn spins the rotor that drives the shaft of an electric generator.²¹ The IEA estimates that wind power produced just over half of one per cent of the world energy supply in 2003,²² however it is documented as the fastest growing form of renewable energy, increasing 48.9% from 1971 to 2003.²³ Wind power is often regarded as an untapped energy source that produces little or no greenhouse gas emissions. A lobby group for wind power, the American Wind Energy Association, states that wind power emits no carbon dioxide in energy production compared to coal which emits 0.966kg per kilowatt per hour, and natural gas that emits 0.47kg per kilowatt per

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The Economist, 'Survey: Damming evidence', *The Economist*, July 19 2003.

¹⁹ New Scientist, 'Hydro's dirty secret revealed', *New Scientist*, March 4 2005.

²⁰ Philip Fearnside, 'Do Hydroelectric Dams Mitigate Global Warming? The Case of Brazil's Curuá-Una Dam', *Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change*, Vol 10, 2005, pp 675–691, p. 678.

²¹ American Wind Energy Association, 'Wind Energy: How Does It Work?', accessed at http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/Wind_Energy_How_does_it_Work.pdf.

²² International Energy Association, 'Renewables in Global Energy: An IEA Fact Sheet', accessed at http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2006/renewable_factsheet.pdf.

²³ Ibid.

BACKGROUND TO NUCLEAR POWER

hour.²⁴ The supporters of the wind power, however, do not include the emissions needed to build wind farms, which mean that it takes up to a year for a wind turbine to generate the same amount of energy that was used to build it.²⁵

The greatest concern for wind power is that it may not have the capacity to provide for base load consumption, because if the wind is not blowing then there is no energy, and where there is excess energy there are significant difficulties in storing it. Many point to Denmark which relies on wind power for 20 per cent of its energy needs²⁶ as an example where wind power can provide base load energy. However, the reason that Denmark can rely on such a variable source of energy is that it can import and export energy when needed with Sweden and Norway.²⁷ Countries such as the UK, and Australia may not be able to rely on such a resource if they do not have the capacity to trade energy with other nations. Wind power is often an expensive form of energy production, and the industry usually receives significant subsidies in the United States and the European Union. Wind power also has an effect on the environment and has been known to kill wildlife. A wind farm in Australia was recently disallowed by a decision by the Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, on the grounds that it might kill an endangered local bird.²⁸ Wind power is most suited to diversify a country's source of energy production as a part of a broader plan to use other renewable energy sources such as hydropower and solar power.

Solar power is considered an underdeveloped energy source. In 2003 it produced almost 0.04% of the world's total energy supply, and has experienced a growth of 28.9% in the last thirty years.²⁹ Solar power can take several different forms that can be particularly versatile in both a domestic and industrial context. The most well-known version of solar power is produced by photovoltaic cells, simply put, the cells contain thousands of crystals that are freed by solar energy when sunlight hits the cell, these crystals which contain electrons can then be induced to travel through an electric circuit³⁰. These cells are ideal for domestic use and according to several studies it saves almost one kilogram of carbon dioxide emissions per kilowatt produced from solar energy.³¹ The second major type of solar power is solar thermal power, which involves solar thermal collectors which use the sun to heat water to produce steam that drives turbines. This type of energy production is being tested in Spain, where the Ministry of Science and Technology is suggesting that

²⁴ American Wind Energy Association, 'Comparative Air Emissions Of Wind and Other Fuels', accessed at <http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/EmissionKB.PDF>.

²⁵ Rowan Hooper, 'Wind Power Takes A Battering', *The New Scientist*, Nov 12-Nov 18, 2005.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ 'Government vetos wind farm development', *The 7.30 Report*, accessed at <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2006/s1617642.htm>.

²⁹ International Energy Association, *Renewables in Global Energy Supply: An IEA Fact Sheet* Accessed at http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2006/renewable_factsheet.pdf

³⁰ Solar Energy Industries Association, 'Solar Energy Types', accessed at <http://www.seia.org/solartypes.php#swl>

³¹ Theocharis Tsoutsosa, Niki Frantzeskakib, Vassilis Gekas, 'Environmental impacts from the solar energy technologies', *Energy Policy* Vol. 33 2005 289–296, 290.

these types of power plants will get larger and more prolific throughout Europe in the next fifteen years.³²

One of the most significant advantages for solar power is the fact that solar power can allow for both domestic and industrial use, which means that it promotes energy independence.³³ When solar power is used domestically it decreases the significant household need from traditional energy sources such as coal and fossil fuel. There continues to be questions as to the affordability of solar power, specifically the cost for photovoltaic cells which make it prohibitive for most households. However, as the use increases and as government, such as the Japanese and German, start to fund and subsidise domestic solar power use the price for this type of technology will significantly decrease.³⁴ As governments continue to invest in this technology, solar power, especially solar thermic power may become a real alternative source of energy. Unlike hydro and wind power, however, solar power cannot provide a relatively constant flow of energy, because ultimately, solar power does not work when the sun does not shine.

The economics of nuclear power – too cheap too meter?³⁵

Nuclear energy is at least competitive and possibly cheaper than other sources of power. In general, analysts have found that each kilowatt produced by nuclear power is slightly less expensive than produced by coal and natural gas, and substantially less expensive than hydropower and wind power. However, the capital cost of building a nuclear plant (US\$2-3 billion) is at least twice that of building a coal burning plant. De-commissioning and waste management costs are also greater for nuclear power plants.

In 2005 an updated OECD and IEA joint report³⁶ found nuclear power to be cheaper than coal in seven out of ten countries and cheaper than gas in nine out of ten countries. In 2003, the French Energy Secretariat published data about the advanced European PWR (EPR) Nuclear Plant which produced energy at a competitive 2.74 US cents/kWh. Capital costs were 60% of a nuclear plant's total costs but only 20% of a gas plant's total cost.³⁷ High capital costs may have implications for the ability of developing world countries to simultaneously fund multiple nuclear power plants and meeting other funding priorities. India, for example, is building ten nuclear plants.

³² Fred Pearce, 'Power of The Midday Sun', *The New Scientist*, April 10-April 16 2006, p. 26.

³³ Theocharis Tsoutsosa, Niki Frantzeskakib, Vassilis Gekas, 'Environmental impacts from the solar energy technologies', *Energy Policy* Vol. 33 2005 289–296, 290.

³⁴ Jeremy Liggett, 'Here Comes The Sun', *The New Scientist*, September 2003, p. 23.

³⁵ An optimistic Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the US Atomic Commission in a speech to the National Association of Science Writers, New York City, September 16th, 1954 reported in the *New York Times*, 17/9/54. Strauss may have been taken out of context.

³⁶ OECD Nuclear Energy Agency & International Energy Agency, *Projected Costs of Generating Electricity* 2005.

³⁷ Percebois, 'The peaceful uses of nuclear energy', *Energy Policy* 31, 101-08, Jan 2003.

BACKGROUND TO NUCLEAR POWER

An important UK Royal Academy of Engineering report in 2004³⁸ looked at electricity generation costs for a new plant in the UK. It found that coal, nuclear and gas plants had a similar kilowatt cost - 2.2 to 2.6 pence/kWh. Adding the carbon costs to coal and gas made nuclear the most inexpensive option. Wind power (with back-up) cost a relatively expensive 5.4 pence/kWh. A recent interdisciplinary Massachusetts Institute of Technology report³⁹ acknowledged the economic competitiveness of nuclear power but emphasized the environmental and political challenges that exist for widespread safe use of this power. Furthermore, as opponents of nuclear power may wish to point out, it is difficult to put a price on the consequences of a nuclear plant meltdown.

Environment and safety – green or glowing green?

Concern about global warming has led to an increasing awareness of our carbon dioxide emissions. In this context, supporters of nuclear power emphasize that no carbon dioxide is produced by a nuclear plant during electricity production. This affirmative/proposition point may be countered in two ways. Firstly, whilst nuclear plants may not emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, activities to support them do cause some emissions. These activities include the mining of uranium, the worldwide transport of various nuclear materials and the storage of waste products. Secondly, if the negative/opposition side has argued for the adoption of alternative energy sources, it should be pointed out that these sources are also largely free of carbon dioxide emissions. There has also been considerable interest in clean coal technologies such as carbon sequestration which would minimize or eliminate carbon dioxide emissions from coal plants. At time of writing, such technologies are experimental. Assuming such technology could be implemented on a large scale in the near future, it would lead to a 50-100% increase in energy costs. Presently the emissions from coal plants contribute significantly to air pollution and smog, which increase respiratory illness rates.

The spectre of the Chernobyl disaster often casts a shadow over any debate about nuclear power. It can pose a challenge to rational and systematic evaluation of the risks of different types of power generation. In a broad sense, the production of power begins with the mining process. Tens of thousands of people die mining coal annually⁴⁰ and it is not uncommon for hundreds of people to die in a single accident. In contrast, only a handful of deaths have occurred in the mining of uranium. This is probably because most uranium mining occurs in Australia and Canada (which have greater safety standards and automation) and because a larger volume of coal is mined than uranium. Nonetheless,

³⁸ Royal Academy of Engineering, *The costs of generating electricity* 2004.

³⁹ Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Future of Nuclear Power* 2003 accessible at <http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/>.

⁴⁰ China alone reports more than 6000 deaths. See BBC News 'China moves to curb mining deaths' 7/3/06 accessible at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4782244.stm>.

there are significant risks of associated with uranium mining and processing. In Australia, for example, workers have unwittingly drunk radioactive water.⁴¹

A particular danger for nuclear plants is the potentially catastrophic effect of a major plant accident or meltdown exposing a large number of people to radioactive material. The Chernobyl disaster occurred because of a combination of plant design and human error. Whilst an expert UN group has found that less than a hundred deaths have resulted from the Chernobyl disaster, it is predicted that a further four thousand deaths may occur.⁴² Affirmative/proposition sides may seek to marginalize the Chernobyl example by pointing out that the RBMK plant design is no longer in use due to many design flaws. Negative/opposition sides can counter this by pointing to the continued cases of human error and technological failure in the industry. In 1999 a Japanese fuel-processing plant in Tokaimura suffered from a criticality incident, releasing radiation levels more than fifteen thousand times the safety limit.⁴³ This is a powerful example because it is recent and occurred in a modern plant with safety features in a technologically advanced country.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, teams can argue against nuclear power by adapting the precautionary principle – the consequences of a nuclear plant meltdown are so disastrous that we ought not to adopt nuclear power, particularly given safer alternatives.

The management of radioactive waste another unique problem of nuclear power generation. Low-level waste comprises of items including clothing, filters, tools which contains low levels of short lived radioactivity. It makes up 90% by volume of all waste and is often buried in shallow landfill in closed containers. Intermediate waste makes up a further 7% by volume (4% of total waste radioactivity).⁴⁵ These chemical sludges, resins and reactor components are often solidified in concrete or bitumen and should be buried underground. Environmental groups such as Greenpeace claim nuclear waste has, in fact, been dumped in oceans causing damage to marine life and exposed humans to increased levels of radiation. Uranium mine tailings are technically not classified as waste but do emit low levels of radiation. Consequently they are usually covered with rock and clay and revegetated or put back into the mine site.

High level waste comprises 1% of total volume but 95% of total radioactivity and is generally either spent fuel or the principal waste from reprocessing. Such waste can be vitrified in borosilicate glass or left as ceramic pellets and sealed in steel canisters for deep underground storage. Significant radioactivity will last approximately a thousand years

⁴¹ ABC '730 Report' 12/4/04 accessible at <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1085850.htm>.

⁴² IAEA 2005, *Chernobyl Forum report, Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts*. Most deaths are due to an increased risk of developing cancer.

⁴³ BBC News 'Nuclear accident shakes Japan' 30/9/99 accessible at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/461446.stm>.

⁴⁴ The Three Mile Island incident also occurred in a developed country though did not result in the release of a great deal of radioactivity.

⁴⁵ OECD NEA, *Radioactive Waste Management in Perspective* 1996; Australian Uranium Information Centre, 'Waste Management in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Briefing Paper #9' 2006.

BACKGROUND TO NUCLEAR POWER

and thus a geological stable site is of paramount importance. The Yucca Mountain site being prepared in the US is near 33 fault lines.⁴⁶ Japan sits near the edge of a tectonic plate – the Pacific Rim. The dry island of Australia has been suggested as a good site for high level waste storage,⁴⁷ partially because of the nation's political stability. Whilst geologically suitable, it is difficult to predict with any certainty the political situation in any nation hundreds of years from now.

An experimental fusion (rather than fission) reactor is currently being built in France at a cost of \$10 billion Euro.⁴⁸ The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) will have the significant advantage of producing waste which is only radioactive for hundreds rather than thousands of years.

Politics & terrorism – are we helping our allies or aiding the enemy?

There can be little doubt that some terrorist groups would welcome the opportunity to use nuclear material in an attack of some sort. Negative/opposition sides may wish to point to scenarios such as planes crashing into nuclear power plants the hijacking of a ship carrying fuel for reprocessing. Affirmative/proposition teams can paint this as an argument for increased security rather than one for abandoning nuclear power. US studies claim plants would be able to withstand a colliding plane.⁴⁹ Future nuclear plants could be built underground at a 20% increased cost. Nuclear material is already shipped at sea under heavy security, minimizing the risk of a hijacking being successful.

An increase in the amount of nuclear material transferred between countries may still increase the chance of some material falling into terrorist hands for possible use in a “dirty” bomb. However, the greatest risk of this happening may be because of the efforts of mercenary scientists (such as Abdul Qadeer Khan or possibly from the former USSR), and because of insufficient security (such as around aging Russian nuclear submarines).⁵⁰ The theft and trafficking of nuclear material is not uncommon – the IAEA reported 182 incidents in the decade to 2003, 18 of which involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium.⁵¹

⁴⁶ The largest is the Ghost Dance Fault. The Nuclear Energy Institute claims the geology is well understood and presumably safe, see <http://www.nei.org/doc.asp?catnum=2&catid=197>.

⁴⁷ Former Australian Prime Minister Hawke speaking to Oxford alumni reported on ABC AM radio program 27/5/05 accessible at <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2005/s1469140.htm>.

⁴⁸ www.iter.org

⁴⁹ Electric Power Research Institute *Aircraft Crash Impact Analysis* 2002 accessible at <http://www.nei.org/documents/EPRINuclearPlantStructuralStudy200212.pdf>.

⁵⁰ See, for example, James Moltz & Tamara Robinson, ‘Dismantling Russia’s Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation’ *Arms Control Today* 29 (June 1999).

⁵¹ Vladimir Orlov ‘Nuclear Trafficking and the New Agenda’ IAEA Bulletin No 461 2004. Data from the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database.

Nuclear power is also opposed by some on the basis that it may contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. It is likely that Pakistan developed nuclear weapons through Khan's knowledge of centrifuge technology learnt whilst working at a European uranium enrichment plant.⁵² India is thought to have developed nuclear weapons by utilizing the capabilities of its CIRUS research reactor, built with Canada's assistance for peaceful purposes.

Proponents of nuclear power can argue that there is no necessary progression between having nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Many nations have nuclear power and have not developed nuclear weapons – it is essentially a question of political will. An effective international inspection regime can allow the benefits of nuclear power without the harm of nuclear weapons proliferation. Emerging technologies such as “SSTAR”⁵³ can be used in suspect countries. These reactors are planned to be tamper resistant, passively safe, and to have a self-contained fuel source lasting thirty years.⁵⁴

The sharing of nuclear power technology and materials may also be a way of improving relationships between states and promoting peace. The ITER fusion nuclear reactor has brought together regional rivals India, China and Japan with Europe, the US and Russia. In return for the US decision to trade uranium, India has agreed to allow inspection of the majority of its nuclear power plants by the IAEA. Furthermore, working together to achieve energy security is one way to avoid future conflicts over energy sources.

Conclusion

Concern about global warming and finite fossil fuel resources have prompted a reconsideration of nuclear power and investigation of renewable energy sources. Evaluation of nuclear power is particularly challenging, due to its significant environmental, economic and political risks and benefits. Investment in energy infrastructure is costly but necessary given increasing energy demands.

This review was compiled by the Editorial Team

⁵² Both reactor fuel and weapons fuel use enriched uranium. However, reactor fuel is usually only 4% enriched compared to 90% enriched for weapons grade material.

⁵³ Acronym for "small, sealed, transportable, autonomous reactor".

⁵⁴ Jeff Hecht 'US plans 'take-away' nuclear power plant' *New Scientist* 4 September 2004.

BACKGROUND TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT or NPT) is a treaty that seeks to regulate and control the spread of nuclear technology, especially with relation to military applications. It was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and on May 11 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely. Ultimately, the treaty aims to promote peaceful use of nuclear technology as much as possible, and potentially eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. As stated in the Preamble to the treaty, it seeks to prevent “the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war”¹, by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons – “believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war”². The treaty has been successful in some cases in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. However, recently the treaty has come under heavy criticism that it is outdated and widely disregarded. This view is propounded by those who point to the continuing struggles that the world faces with regards to Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions, as well as India, Pakistan and Israel’s continued refusal to sign the NPT.

Overview of the NPT

The NPT has three main objectives – those of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to use nuclear technology for non-military (energy and medical) purposes. The treaty makes a distinction between Nuclear Weapon States, or NWS (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US – also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, or NNWS. Under the treaty, those states possessing nuclear weapons technology undertake not spread the technology for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Similarly, those states not possessing nuclear weapon technology undertake not to seek out or to develop nuclear weapon capacity. In this way, the treaty seeks, at a very basic level, to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Article VII also provides for countries to undertake regional treaties amongst themselves, to prevent proliferation in their respective regions.

Disarmament is an agreement in principle for a treaty in the future to bring about the reduction, and, potentially, the complete abandonment, of nuclear weapons. The NPT does not specify a framework under which disarmament can occur; instead it incorporates a general agreement to pursue disarmament through further treaties. However, to date there has been comparatively little progress on creating a follow-up treaty – most of the focus has been on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons to so-called rogue states. The most significant global treaty to tackle disarmament that has been proposed is the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a treaty which would seek to cease the further production of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.³ This would apply to not only

¹ The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968)

² Ibid.

³ “A bid to halt nuclear production” *Janes Intelligence Digest*, June 8 2006

those states that are permitted to have nuclear weapons, but also the ‘de-facto nuclear states’ – countries who are not party to the NPT, but still possess nuclear weapons. This would be a significant step in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as it would encompass all countries in possession of nuclear weapons, and would likely have to be the first step towards disarmament.

On the other hand, the words and actions of some NWS appear contrary to disarmament. For example, the US has plans to modernize its nuclear arsenal and developed the “mini-nuke”⁴. Earlier this year, the President of France, said he would be prepared to use nuclear weapons in response to any attack involving chemical or biological weapons, even potentially one enacted by terrorists⁵. This contrasts with France’s previously stated position that it would only use such weapons in response to nuclear attack, or invasion (such as by the USSR). Updating a nuclear arsenal and expanding a nation’s nuclear response doctrine do not seem to be actions consistent with impending disarmament.

In the UK there has been debate over the renewal of the Trident nuclear missiles⁶. During the elected term of this Parliament (up to 2010) a decision will have to be made on whether to upgrade the aging Trident nuclear missile, the UK’s only nuclear warhead delivery system. In effect, a decision to renew will effectively be declaring that the UK will retain nuclear weapons for approximately another fifty years. A ‘no’ vote will likely result in the UK becoming the first NWS to fulfill their NPT obligations to disarm.

The third pillar of the NPT is the most controversial, and causes the most problems. This pillar recognizes the right for all states to own and to use nuclear technology for peaceful, non-military purposes – usually energy-related. Indeed, the treaty stipulates that parties signatory to the treaty should facilitate the exchange of technology, materials and equipment, and indeed encourages the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. All countries wishing to pursue peaceful nuclear technology, and wishing to receive technology and equipment transfers from other states, are required to submit themselves to an international regulatory framework – currently the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The rationale behind this is to prevent states from undertaking covert, unsupervised nuclear research, which could lead to nuclear weapons. Thus, if the expertise and technology is easily available, and nuclear facilities are regularly inspected, countries will not be able to pursue further research without attracting attention.

The final aspect of the NPT that is often criticized is Article X – or the “escape clause”. The treaty recognizes “national sovereignty” and allows parties to the treaty to withdraw if “extraordinary circumstances” dictate that adhering to the treaty would result in jeopardizing the “supreme interests of its country”⁷. Notice of withdrawal must be served a minimum of three months prior to withdrawal from the treaty. It should be noted that many treaties have an “escape clause”, often as a way of making signing a treaty more

⁴ “Sub-critical tests: new nukes?” *Janes Intelligence Digest*, March 17, 2006

⁵ “Chirac’s nuclear warning” *Janes Intelligence Digest*, February 10, 2006

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968)

BACKGROUND TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

palatable to sovereign nation-states. The Ottawa treaty, which bans landmines, and which many would hope would be irreversible, has a similar provision⁸.

Success stories

To date, South Africa represents arguably the best example of the effectiveness of the NPT. Having pursued nuclear weapons secretly throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s⁹, South Africa signed the NPT in 1991 as a non-nuclear weapon state. Then, in 1993, South Africa announced its weapons program, as well as its dismantlement, thus fulfilling South Africa's requirements as a NNWS. It was through the mechanisms and co-operation provided for in the NPT that South Africa was enticed into the NPT, and then to complete disarmament. Now, South Africa is a frequent participant in NPT discussions, and campaigns actively on the issue of complete disarmament.

To a lesser extent, Brazil and Argentina are also regarded as success stories for the NPT. Both countries pursued nuclear technology through out the 1970s and 1980s, with Brazil even producing two nuclear weapons. However, having acceded to Treaty of Tlatelolco (a regional non-proliferation treaty negotiated by the Latin American countries) in 1994 and the NPT in 1995, both have now abandoned their military nuclear programs, and have opened their facilities up to inspection by the IAEA.

North Korea

A frequent criticism of the provision in Article X is that it is very easy for a country to gain access to nuclear equipment, some of which can be used for both peaceful and military applications. Then, having gained sufficient technology and expertise, a country can, quite legally, withdraw from the NPT and build on its current nuclear knowledge and take an extra step to developing nuclear weapons. Obviously, a state cannot make the leap from peaceful nuclear technology to nuclear weapons straight away, however, the equipment and technology gained through pursuing peaceful nuclear energy provides arguably the best platform from which to develop nuclear weapons.

This particular weakness has been brought into sharp focus recently with the case of North Korea. North Korea was a party to the NPT up until 2003, when it signalled its intention to withdraw from the NPT – it had previously signalled withdrawal earlier in 1993, but backed down¹⁰. North Korea had gained significant nuclear technology, and it is thought that this was used to create nuclear weapons – the possession of which North Korea announced in early 2005. Since then, “Six-party talks” between North Korea, China, the US, Japan, Russia and South Korea have occurred, but not much real progress has been made. When North Korea withdrew from the NPT, it cited increasing US

⁸ Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Article 20

⁹ Simpson, J., and Howlett, D., (1995), *The Future of the NPT*, MacMillan Press

¹⁰ Norris, R. S., Kristensen, H. M., (2005) “NRDC: Nuclear Notebook – North Korea's Nuclear Program 2005”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol.61: no.3, pp. 64-67

hostility towards it as the reason, and still maintains that the current administrations' policies necessitate North Korea having nuclear weapons. A tentative agreement had been made, whereby North Korea would receive limited access to nuclear technology, as well as aid, in return for disarmament and readmitting IAEA inspectors¹¹. However, the major stumbling block to a resolution is that neither side is willing to make the first move – North Korea wants aid and technology before it scraps its weapons programs and readmits weapons inspectors, whilst the US will not give anything over until it sees progress on the North Korean side. Indeed, North Korea has often attempted to force the issue – during June of 2006, United States intelligence indicated that North Korea was preparing to test a Taepodong 2 missile (capable of reaching the West Coast of the United States), increasing concerns that North Korea would soon have the capability to directly attack the United States with nuclear weapons¹².

Iran

Iran is signatory to the NPT, and has been for many years. However, in 2003, reports from the IAEA indicated that Iran had a secret uranium enrichment program that it had hidden for eighteen years. This program had not been opened to inspection, and was voluntarily ceased in late 2004. The program was started again in early 2006, however, and was met with great criticism from the West. Indeed, the IAEA referred Iran to the Security Council upon the resumption of the program¹³.

The Iranian position has been quite consistent – Iran has maintained that it has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and will not pursue nuclear weapons. Indeed, the country's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa, or religious decree, forbidding the production or use of nuclear weapons. Under the NPT, Iran is not doing anything illegal – as noted earlier, the NPT recognizes the “inalienable right” of all states to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indeed, the US has had a history of looking the other way when it comes to Israel's alleged nuclear program, and there has been little response to Brazil's own enrichment program, leading to claims of double-standards. However, Iran has abundant oil reserves, and thus is not likely to need nuclear energy for power. As a result, it is thought that any enrichment of nuclear material is most likely a front to develop nuclear material for military use. Further, Iran is seen as far more dangerous and unstable – it does not recognize the state of Israel and has repeatedly called for its destruction, and it is a known sponsor of international terrorist organizations¹⁴. As a result, the US and other allies are hesitant to allow Iran to gain nuclear weapons.

Recently, the US and EU proposed a package of incentives, allowing Iran limited access to nuclear energy reactors, nuclear material, as well as support for Iranian membership of the

¹¹ “North Korea Says it Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts” *The New York Times*, September 19, 2005

¹² “Fresh Concerns over North Korea Nuclear ‘Test’” 21 June 2006

¹³ Zunes, S., (2005) “The U.S. and Iran: Democracy, Terrorism, and Nuclear Weapons,” Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: *Foreign Policy In Focus*, July

¹⁴ Zarboski, J., (2005) “Deterring a Nuclear Iran”, *Washington Quarterly*, issue 28:3, pp153-167

BACKGROUND TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

World Trade Organisation. In return, Iran would be required to suspend its enrichment programs. This represented a significant step forward, as the US had not been willing to negotiate with Iran directly since the hostage crisis in 1979. Iran has indicated that it is unlikely to back down from its enrichment program, however, Iran has also shown a willingness and a desire for a resolution to the issue and most parties seem optimistic that a peaceful resolution will come about¹⁵.

Parties outside the treaty – Israel, India and Pakistan

The NPT is not universally recognized. Three prominent countries have openly refused to sign the treaty – Israel, India and Pakistan. Israel is widely suspected to have nuclear weapons, however, it has not conducted any known tests, and as such these claims cannot be verified. It is known that there is – or at least was – a nuclear weapons program in Israel, after Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli scientist, revealed the details to the British Press. Israel has neither confirmed nor denied the existence of its alleged nuclear weapons, and chooses instead to focus its attention on the objection to the NPT¹⁶.

India and Pakistan both are known to have nuclear weapons – both have conducted prominent nuclear tests, and both have made public their nuclear capability. These two countries, along with Israel, have been the loudest critics of the entire NPT regime. The NPT, they say, makes an arbitrary moral judgment about which countries can and cannot own nuclear weapons, based purely upon which countries were known to have nuclear weapons at the time the treaty was written. They argue that there is no ethical basis for this distinction, and that it is unfair to restrict certain countries' access to nuclear weapons, simply because they did not develop them by the time the treaty was written¹⁷.

Indeed, the situation with India was brought into focus recently, with the US agreeing to sell uranium to India. As part of the deal, fourteen of India's twenty two nuclear reactors would be designated civilian reactors, and would thus be open for inspection by the IAEA. The remaining eight nuclear reactors would be military facilities, and would not be open for inspection¹⁸.

On the one hand, this deal did a lot to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the NPT, and there were many critics both inside and outside the US, who argued that the US should have driven a harder bargain, and required India to accede to the NPT. Under the NPT, of course, the US was only to transfer nuclear materials to those states that had subjected themselves to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, and to the IAEA inspection regime. India was not signatory to the NPT (and still is not), and indeed it was known to not only have peaceful nuclear technology, but also military nuclear technology. By not adhering to the conditions of the NPT, and granting India an exception, the US

¹⁵ "Bush Encouraged by Iran Response", *BBC news*, 6 June, 2006

¹⁶ Evron, Y., (1994), *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma*, Routledge: London

¹⁷ Simpson, J., and Howlett, D., (1995), *The Future of the NPT*, MacMillan Press

¹⁸ "India and US Seal Nuclear Accord", *BBC News*, 2 March, 2006

has significantly undermined the ability of other countries (and in some cases, the US itself) to force other states to comply with the provisions of the NPT. Critics in the US pointed to India's close ties with Iran, as well as the signal this would send to other countries in the region¹⁹. Indeed, Pakistan was quick to indicate that it too desired such a deal – although there is little indication that this will occur, as the US regards Pakistan to have much poorer standards with regards to nuclear weapons, and nuclear proliferation. Pakistan is notable for producing the infamous Abdul Qadeer Khan, a nuclear scientist who created a worldwide black market network for nuclear technology. It is suspected that North Korea, Iran, and potentially Brazil, received some of their technology through the Khan network.

Another major objection is that this deal is likely to cause more nuclear weapons to be created – not only in India, but also in other countries in the region, especially Pakistan. Even if no nuclear material from the US goes to weapons, it would free up other nuclear material that could now be used to create new weapons. Further, the prospect of India now having a tacit legitimacy to build up nuclear weapons would certainly have an impact on other countries in the region, and their own military build-up. This directly goes against what the NPT aims to do – controlling the spread of weapons, and trying to disarm.

Supporters of the deal point out that this is a positive step towards getting India to co-operate – previously India had no participation whatsoever in the global non-proliferation and inspection regime. Under the new deal, India has taken a significant step towards involving itself in the global regime, and has made moves towards fulfilling NPT requirements, even though it isn't signatory. Supporters argue that it is better to have India opening some reactors up for inspection, as opposed to none. Further, they argue that it lays the groundwork for future deals to be made on non-proliferation, as it forges closer ties and shows both parties are willing to compromise and bargain in good faith.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the NPT is still the only global mechanism to regulate the proliferation of nuclear weapons – other treaties, dealing with a particular region or class of weapons, exist as well, however, none of them has the scope of the NPT. The NPT has been shown to be successful in several cases, and represents a good framework within which to conduct discussions. However, there needs to be a recognition that it cannot serve as the only basis for non-proliferation, and concessions may have to be made to parties outside the NPT, so as to bring them into the discussion and engage with them on issues of non-proliferation and disarmament.

This review was compiled by the Editorial Team

¹⁹ Hallinan, C., (2005) "Sleight of Hand: India, Iran, & the United States," Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: *Foreign Policy In Focus*, October

DEBATING POLICY

MONASH
DEBATING
R e v i e w

MANNER, CULTURE AND THE RISE OF ASIAN DEBATE

About the author: Jason Jarvis is currently a lecturer and Assistant Dean at the Korea Development Institute Graduate School of Public Policy and Management in Seoul, South Korea. He is the founder and director of the Asian Debate Institute and the Northeast Asian Open College Debate Championship. He has adjudicated the finals of several international tournaments, including the World Debating Championships, the All Asians Debating Championships, and the Grand Final of the 2006 Asian Universities Debating Championships.

Over the course of the past decade Debate has grown tremendously throughout the Asian region. The Asian debating championships are entering their fourteenth year, and a second Asian championship was inaugurated in 2005, signifying that the region now has multiple generations of debaters that have represented Asian institutions. More importantly, the past four years has seen a dramatic rise in the presence of Northeast Asian debaters in the international community. The largest group of Japanese debaters to ever attend the World Universities Debating Championship (some 19 different institutions) participated in the 2004-2005 competition in hosted by Multi-Media University in Malaysia. Similarly, Korean institutions have become regular participants on the international debating stage over the past 3 years, demonstrating the rise of both Northeast Asia and the continued development of Asian debating as a whole.

Unfortunately, the success of some Asian debaters is tempered by the failure of many Asians to adapt successfully to the rules of the international debating game. Extensive discussion, dispute and time have been devoted at endless Council meetings in an effort to address the position of these debaters and to make the debating more inclusive. Alternative divisions such as “English as a Second Language,” or “English as a Foreign Language,” have been created with the notion that the main barrier to success is English speaking ability. These divisions have failed because they are easily abused, and because they ghettoise these students by labelling them in a not altogether positive fashion. While the language barrier is undoubtedly higher for some groups than others, the real problem is not English, it is culture.

Despite all the energy expended to make debating seemingly more inclusive, no one has yet identified the root causes of the problem: an inappropriate emphasis on the role of Manner in debate. Despite the rise of non-Western communities, Parliamentary Debate, modeled on the British system is the international norm and standard for debating competitions throughout the world. At the WUDC competition, Manner (Style) accounts for 50% of scoring, while at Asian competitions it represents 40% of the score. Manner is a cultural construct that, as currently practiced, emphasizes Western values of proper communication.

The fact that Manner was incorporated into the Asian Parliamentary format is demonstrative of the cultural hegemony that exists in international debating. Some will suggest that the fact that Asian Parliamentary adopted Manner as a scoring category is indicative of its status as a culturally neutral category. This argument is false. The Asian Parliamentary format was created as a middle ground between British Parliamentary format and the Australasians format. It was not, and is not, a “uniquely Asian” creation, and in fact is remarkably similar to the World Schools Debating Championship format used for high schools. At most, the Asian Parliamentary format is a Southeast Asian creation which fails to account for the increasing participation of the Northeast Asian community. The fact that the Asian Universities Debating Championship and All Asians have *both* adopted an English as a Foreign Language division is proof of the criticism offered in this paper, as the format has managed to disenfranchise a number of debaters for cultural reasons.

Communication Characteristics of Western and Asian Communities

Manner, as commonly understood is style, or “a speaker’s ability to communicate the arguments, evidence and analysis s/he wishes to impart to the audience, as well as the means and techniques used by that speaker to do so.”¹ The most important question to be asked, then, is what techniques and speaking norms are encouraged by participants in international competitions? How is an adjudicator supposed to judge the ability of a speaker? Not surprisingly, the most successful debaters employ speaking styles that are recognisable to Westerners and which incorporate Western cultural practices.

Western speakers employ a number of techniques and behaviours that are unique to Western culture and society. Initially, Westerners value eye contact. Making eye contact is considered essential to maintaining a relationship with an audience and to ensuring that others trust you. People that attempt to hide or divert their eyes are perceived as being shifty or trying to conceal something from the person(s) they are speaking too. Second, Westerners generally perceive speakers to be equal in authority unless there is some official title or rationale for viewing another person as having expertise on a subject.

Third, Westerners generally have a more confrontational speaking style. Interrupting a speaker is acceptable during the middle of a speech (for example, asking questions), and is often encouraged. A professor giving a lecture, will believe that the students are unprepared or disinterested if they offer no questions about the material that is being covered in the presentation. Finally, English requires no status distinctions in the language and words used when addressing others. Polite speech and impolite speech are marked by the word chosen, not by different verb conjugations or stem endings.

Asian speaking reflects a very different set of cultural values. Initially, Asians generally shy away from conflict. Interrupting a speaker or asking questions is often a sign of rudeness

¹ Garcia, Pascual. *An Introduction to English Language Debate in Asia*. Ed: Brendan Howe. Seoul, Korea: Ewha University Press 2005.

or insubordination. Korean students, for example, are encouraged to review and remember information on their own. Asking questions is perceived to be impolite to the professor or teacher. Conflict and contradiction are avoided at all costs. When disagreements do occur, they are handled modestly and with extreme deference to the other person. This may take the form of presenting an alternative solution to a problem, but crediting the original presenter with the idea.

Second, eye contact is often avoided. When speaking to another person it is acceptable to make eye contact occasionally, but not to stare. Speakers frequently look down when talking to others, particularly when the person they are speaking to is of a higher status than them. Finally, all people are not presumed to have similar authority. Older citizens are culturally acknowledged as being more wise and knowledgeable whenever they speak. Korean children know that they must avoid contradicting their grandparents or someone who is older than them at all costs. In speaking to older people it is often necessary to use entirely different words, or high status verb conjugations. Many non-native speakers (particularly Northeast Asians) remark that this is a huge difference from English that makes English significantly less formal than their native tongue.

Manner is the fundamental manifestation of the issues identified above in a debating context. It is obvious to anyone who has spent significant time in Western and non-Western countries that ‘good speaking style’ is culturally relative. It would seem, therefore, that ‘good manner’ is something that would be impossible to evaluate in a multicultural debating context. Strangely, in constructing competitions this fact seems to have been ignored.

The Impacts of a Manner Focus

A simple cultural question to ask is if a language even possesses a word for debate. Korean has no such word, and the word used “toh-ron” is a word derived from Chinese that simply means “discussion,” not debate as understood by Westerners. Japanese debaters often use “debat-ah” for similar linguistic reasons in discussing debate. This demonstrates the extreme cultural dissonance that debate creates for many Asian debaters. The process of debating is challenging enough, yet to be forced to adopt a speaking style, enforced through a scoring process, is the essence of cultural colonisation, and is a practice that the international community needs to reconsider.

The dangers of using Manner as a scoring technique for 40-50% of a debate decision are numerous. First, it is culturally imperialist. It is unclear how it would be possible to establish norms for manner and not impose a unique set of cultural practices upon participants. Non-Western debaters are asked to learn a new language and then to learn a new set of cultural practices. It is untrue to suggest that learning a new language (English) necessarily requires learning an entirely new set of cultural practices. The globalisation of English demonstrates that different cultures and communities create their own dialects and infuse their usage of English with their own cultural norms. An Argentinean English

speaker will still have a speaking style that is reflective of the techniques and norms of Argentinean culture that they have been taught to use.

The myriad number of English dialects are also indicative of the way communities infuse English with their own cultural values. Indeed, in suggesting that English is a “second” language for someone, it now seems appropriate to ask: what type of English? There is no monolithic English language and the diversity of accents, phrases and patterns of speech is so large that even native speakers can feel overwhelmed. British and American English are often taught as separate courses in language schools and South Asian English is a unique dialect that takes time to understand.

It is the demand that a student learn *Western* speaking styles in order to achieve a high Manner score that takes this practice into the realm of cultural imperialism. This fact is empirically demonstrated by the experience of Korean debaters who have participated in both domestic and international tournaments. Korean debaters that have attended international competitions uniformly report that the way that they debate at World’s or Asian’s is different from the style that they must use when debating at Korean language tournaments. Even more striking is the fact that they indicate that if they use the international speaking style back home, it causes them to *lose* debates, as the Korean judges are offended by their Manner and style of presentation in their speeches and when asking questions.

Another Korean professor remarked that she felt that the critical thinking and research skills that her students were learning from Parliamentary debate were wonderful. However, she seriously considered eliminating debate from her curriculum and as an extra-curricular activity because she felt that the style of communication it taught was terrible and ultimately destructive to good communication. In the end, she is not confident that her students should learn to talk to people in the way that they must in order to get a high Manner score.

Second, demanding that adjudicators use Manner as a significant standard for adjudication invites judges to discriminate against non-Western/non-Native speakers. A person who has tremendous substantive arguments (good Matter) but who is not fluent in English, by definition, has bad Manner. Good arguments are routinely ignored at international competitions simply because the speaker has a heavy accent, or doesn’t speak English perfectly (despite significant talk during rules reviews on opening days that this shouldn’t be done). The number of times debaters at competitions have said “I sounded worse than a Japanese (or Chinese, or Korean) debater” at a competition is terrible! It is also demonstrative of the fact that it is accepted practice in international competitions to ignore an argument based entirely on the fluency (or nationality) of the debater making the presentation.

This is *not* a language problem, it is a discrimination problem rooted in a system that rewards style by as much as 50%. Moreover, if debaters are not aggressive enough in Points of Information, or if they are deferential in their presentation style then they have

violated what adjudicators are *taught* is good Manner. The institutionalisation of adjudicator preferences through training and through 'Judge Breaks' for elimination rounds, demands that adjudicators follow accepted Western cultural norms in evaluating Manner. This is true *even if* the adjudicator is not Western.

Undoubtedly, it is possible to point to the success of Asian debaters at international competitions in an effort to discredit these claims. However, all of these examples are of debaters who have done this in spite of the barriers they face. Additionally, most of these examples are people who come from former Commonwealth countries or countries where there has been significant Western presence (India, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia). The argument here is not that Asians (or non-Westerners generally) are unable to learn and adapt to these cultural systems. Rather, the question is whether it is appropriate to ask them to do so. More importantly, is it necessary to saddle debaters with a situation where the competition sanctifies linguistic and cultural discrimination?

Finally, this discrimination extends beyond the debate round. Council meetings at international competitions are notoriously long, albeit necessary evils as they create tournament policies that influence future competitions. The stylistic norms present inside debates are replicated in Council meetings. Despite the consistently large contingent of Japanese institutions attending these competitions, these debaters often sit in the meetings and remain silent without expressing their views, even on issues which clearly impact them. There are a variety of explanations for this silence: they don't have the English ability to interact, they don't desire to express their opinion and so forth. However, it is also likely that they and other non-Westerners are simply representing their cultural norms in an environment where all dialogue is predicated upon different cultural standards. This silence is, in fact, instructional as it illustrates the limits the situation has placed upon them, as Paulo Friere explains:

In all stages of decoding, people exteriorize their view of the world. And in the way they think about and face the world—fatalistically, dynamically, or statically—their generative themes may be found. A group which does not concretely express a generative thematics—a fact which might appear to imply the nonexistence of themes—is, on the contrary, suggesting a very dramatic theme: the theme of silence. The theme of silence suggests a structure of mutism in the face of the overwhelming force of limit situations.²

Modest, deferential speech is a sure way to be discounted in a room of people who are unfamiliar with that form of communication, and who are conditioned to reward alternative patterns of interaction. The irony here is that the silence of some of these communities is a form of communication and that despite the brilliant minds that participate in debate, many of us have been unable to recognize it. By championing one set of cultural practices, the international debating community has created an environment that is exclusive of people who are unwilling to check much of their cultural heritage at

² Friere, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York, NY: Continuum 2000, p 106

the door, or for whom Western patterns of communication are altogether unfamiliar and intimidating.

Solutions

The international debate community constantly confronts the question of non-Westerners, but the issue is always framed as an English problem created by non-native speakers, rather than a cultural problem created by the format that is being used. Essentially, it is time that the international governing bodies of debate stop blaming the victims. Despite the tremendous growth in the debate around the world, very few structural changes have been undertaken to adapt these events to the growth in non-Western participation. Western countries dominate the WUDC, and in Asian regional competitions, former Commonwealth countries duplicate this pattern of success. From the dominant perspective, there is very little incentive to foster substantive changes. The larger numbers increase competition prestige, and as of yet, no one has challenged the format effectively to foster a more inclusive environment. Friere, in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, accurately describes the current situation:

Why do the dominant elites not become debilitated when they do not think with the people? Because the latter constitute their antithesis, their very reason for existence. If the elites were to think with the people, the contradiction would be superseded and they could no longer dominate. From the point of view of the dominators in any epoch, correct thinking presupposes the non-thinking of the people.³

Ultimately, the community has to decide what it means to be inclusive. If inclusion simply means creating ESL and EFL divisions which ignore the structural imposition of cultural norms that currently occurs, then they will inevitably limit the participation, and success, of others in the competition and ultimately continue to institutionalise discriminatory practices. Alternatively, a step in the right direction would be to reform the scoring system, and integrate cultural awareness training into international competitions.

There are two broadly compelling reasons to undertake reforms. First, it should be noted that the respective international competitions have a moral obligation to take some action on this subject because it is imperative that they maintain consistency with their own charters. Most international competitions contain statements about discrimination based on gender, race, and other immutable factors in their governing constitutions and rules. Requiring debaters to use culturally biased criteria as participants or adjudicators is hypocritical and implies that the current criteria are culturally neutral. From a consistency perspective alone, it is necessary to rectify this imbalance.

Second, the symbolic value of such a move is extremely significant. A reform of the scoring system would send a signal that subjective and culturally relative standards of

³ Friere, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York, NY: Continuum 2000, p 131

speaking style are not appropriate bases for winning or losing a debate. This would also demonstrate that the tournament strongly desires to accommodate the wide variety of peoples and cultures that exist within their region, and the world. The world debating community, in particular, needs to reflect the diversity of the world, and shouldn't be in the business of imposing one culturally specific set of criteria upon others.

The suggestions below should not be considered to be final solutions. At this point it is imperative that a larger dialogue about the role of Manner be initiated. The contribution of others, particularly non-Western, non-native English speakers, is essential to crafting solutions that serve the best interests of the global debating community. Nonetheless, the suggestions below serve, at a minimum, as a starting point for considering reforms which should be made to eliminate the problems outlined in this article.

Solution #1: Reform the Content of Manner

Redefining what Manner is, might be an alternative. It is possible that by retraining the community to understand what effective Manner should be in multi cultural context would be enough to address the problem. In discussing this issue, one DCA for the All Asians indicated that the problems were obvious enough, but that perhaps by incorporating Structure or other factors as key concepts in Manner that it might be possible to divert the focus from style to organization in conceptualising Manner for adjudicators. In essence this suggestion would see an expansion of some elements often thought of as Method in Asian Parliamentary to have greater weight in competitions.

A potential problem here is that this change is not substantive enough to warrant actual changes in adjudication practices. Additionally, the fight over what aspects of Manner should be retained and which should be eliminated is likely to be just as difficult as determining who is ESL and who isn't at the WUDC each year.

Solution #2: Eliminate Manner as a Category

While this solution will seem too radical to many people, it would be a good move because it would end the sanctioning of adjudicator intervention by discouraging the use of culturally biased standards for good speaking. A focus on the arguments and their contents alone would be helpful in attempting to level the playing field for non-native and non-Western participants. The bottom line is that students who make the best arguments should win the debate. The fluency of the competitor should not be a standard for evaluation, and Manner, far too often is measured by fluency. This is especially true for people that fall under the designation of English as a Foreign Language.

Eliminating Manner as one of the official criteria of judging will not destroy style in speaking. Such a claim is empirically disproved by the multiple formats of debate utilized in the United States (at thousands of tournaments annually) that *do not* utilize style and manner as a primary scoring criterion. Some people are better speakers than others for whatever reason. The ability to move an audience is not likely to be destroyed by a

change in the rules. Indeed, one of the other problems with Manner is the fact that it is inherently subjective (and culturally specific). Attempting to measure it mathematically is a practice in arbitrariness. However, it would be difficult for an adjudicator to justify a ballot against a team which is not fluent if they have to focus solely on their arguments and can no longer use the fact that their grammar inhibits their Manner as a criterion for losing.

Solution #3: Decrease the percentage value of Manner

A compelling argument can be made, that while Manner may be culturally relative, it is inappropriate to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Given the emphasis on age and authority in many Asian communities, it would be impossible to have a competition if such cultural practices were followed. It is clear that some cultural practices of communication are inappropriate for any competition focused upon speaking. Therefore, a compromise solution would be to lower the value of Manner in a judge's decision making criteria.

For example, if Manner were to account for 20% of a team's score, it would serve to acknowledge the fact that the primary focus of the debate is on a team's ability to construct well developed arguments. At the same time, the way in which the arguments are presented is still relevant, and in a close debate could easily function as the deciding factor. Under such a scenario it would still be difficult for an adjudicator to justify a vote against a less fluent team if their arguments were clearly stronger, but the value of style in persuasion would still be acknowledged.

It would seem that one of the real dangers for any solution is that the dominant voices will attempt to acknowledge the criticism of this article, and attempt to make the most minimal, gradual change possible to silence critics in attempt to pacify them, while maintaining the status quo. The ESL and EFL divisions, while laudable, are precisely the type of stop-gap, gradualist changes that maintain the cultural hegemony of the current system without making any real alteration in the root causes of the problem.

Finally, it seems clear that one of the critical changes that must accompany any reform is a component of cultural sensitivity training for adjudicators. Many people simply lack an understanding of the way other communities of people communicate with each other and if instructed to be more sensitive (and how to do so) would make genuine efforts. This is why it is essential for the relevant governing Councils to go beyond cosmetic reforms such as ESL or EFL break rounds and to integrate real accommodative changes into the main tournament.

Ultimately, a multicultural competition will face problems on many fronts. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon the organizers of competitions to consider the way the rules reflect the current community, and what purpose is served by each of them. Given the rising clamor of non-Western participants for inclusion, and their increasing support for international competitions, it is necessary to examine the standards that adjudicators are asked to use

and to determine if they promote or inhibit the educational environment of debate competitions. For all the reasons above: *This house believes that the time has come to reform Manner.*

RESULTS

The MDR would like to congratulate:

World University Debating Championships

Host: University College Dublin, Ireland
Champions: Hart House, University of Toronto A (Joanna Nairn & Michael Kotrly)
Runners Up: University of Chicago A (Daragh Grant & Patrick Emerson)
Honourable Society of the Inner Temple A (Greg Ó Ceallaigh & Charlie Sparling)
Yale University E (David Denton & Josh Bone)
Best Speakers: Beth O'Connor & Rory Gillis (Yale University)
ESL Champions: University of Erasmus A (Lars Duursma & Sharon Kroes)
ESL Runners Up: University of Bonaparte A (Daniel Schut & Anne Valkering)
IU Bremen A
Babes Bolyai University A
ESL Best Speaker: Anat Gelber (University of Haifa)
Masters Champions: Canada (Neil Harvey-Smith & Jess Harvey-Smith)
Sean O'Quigley (Ireland)
Public Speaking Champion: O'Neill Simpson (University of West Indies – Cave Hill)
Comedy Champion: Jessica Moir (University of Melbourne)

AustralAsian Intervarsity Debating Championships

Host: University of Queensland, Australia
Champions: University of Sydney B (Ivan Ah Sam, Brad Lancken and Patrick Meagher)
Runners Up: Ateneo de Manila University A (Lisandro Claudio, Sharmila Parmanand & Charisse Borromeo)
Best Speaker: Ivan Ah Sam (University of Sydney)
ESL Champions: International Islamic University B (Wan Mohd Asnur Bin Wan Jantan, Syed Suhaib Hassan & Adam Ho Chee Choong)
ESL Runners Up: UT MARA A (Danial Amir, Iqbal Hafiedz & Muhammad Faiz Arshad)

All-Asian Intervarsity Debating Championships

Host: University of Putra, Malaysia
Champions: Multimedia University A (Logandran Balavijendran Sumithra Rajendra & Ng Eu Jin)
Runners Up: Rashtriya Vidyalaya College of Engineering (Mrinal Manohar, Vijayendra Suda, Ankur Prasad)
Best Speaker: Iqbal Hafiedz (UT MARA)
EFL Champions: Chulalongkorn University E (Veena Borpitpitak, Tanuch Larpnimitshai, Pawat Satayanurug)
EFL Runners Up: Tokyo University A (Shunsuke Ishimoto, Hirofumi Jinno, Chihiro Nakagawa)

Asian University Debating Championships

Host: Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
 Champions: Ateneo de Manila University A (Leloy Claudio, Sharmila Parmanand & Charisse Borrromeo)
 Runners Up: Ateneo de Manila University B (Glen Tuazon, Mahar Mangahas & Miko Biscocho)
 Best Speaker: Charisse Borrromeo (Ateneo de Manila University)
 EFL Champions: Bina Nusantara University A (Sarel Dika, Siti Nur Aulyana & Christiyani Ranthi)
 EFL Runners Up: Hanyang University B (Chris Kim, Linda Kim, Chun)

Northeast Asian Open Debate Championships

Host: Yonsei University, Korea
 Champions: Ewha Woman's University B (Reel Khalifa, Ji Eun Song & Wendie Kim)
 Runners Up: Tokyo University A (Chihiro Nakagawa, Yoshihiro Kobayashi & Mihoko Saito)
 Novice Champions: Kyung Hee Suwon 2 (Jin, Soon Ae, Jun Hani & Jeon, Seung Hee)
 Best Speaker: Mihoko Saito (University of Tokyo)
 Best Novice Speaker: Guen Young Kim (Ewha Woman's University)

European University Debating Championships

Host: Berlin Debating Union, Germany
 Champions: Oxford University A (Alex Bets & Gavin Illsey)
 Runners Up: University College Cork A (Tony Murphy & Derek Doyle)
 Glasgow University A (Niall Kennedy & Niall Rowantree)
 Durham University B (Siddharth Khajur & Ian Chapman)
 Best Speaker: Will Jones (Oxford University)
 ESL Champions: University of Bonn A (Isabelle Loewe and Matthias Lux)
 ESL Runners Up: Debattierclub Münschen A (Aurora Simionescu & Daniel Grotzky)
 University of Erasmus A (Mark Roels & Lars Duursma)
 University of Bonaparte A (Daniel Schut & Anne Valkering)
 ESL Best Speaker: Mark Roels (University of Erasmus)

North American Debating Championships

Host: Hart House, University of Toronto, Canada
 Champions: Yale University (Ben Eidelson & Matt Wansley)
 Runners Up: Queen's University (Laura Kusisto & Adam Lazier)
 Best Speaker: Rory Gillis (Yale University)
 Novice Champion: Jed Glickstein & Andrew Rohrbach (Yale University)
 Best Novice Speaker: Andrew Rohrbach (Yale University)

RESULTS

Melbourne Pre-Australs Invitational

Host: University of Melbourne, Australia
Champions: Monash University (Jacob Clifton, Tom Chapman, Roland Dillon)
Runners Up: University of Melbourne (Elizabeth Sheargold, Jess Moir, Lucia Pietrapoli)
Best Speaker: Jacob Clifton (Monash University)

Australian Intersvarsity Novice Debating Championships

Host: Australian National University, Australia
Champions: Australian National University A (Claudia Newman Martin, Celia Winnett & Matthew Sherman)
Runners Up: University of Sydney C (Tom Kaldor, Steph Paton & Bronwyn Cowell)
Best Speaker: Amit Golder (Monash University)
Best Novice Speaker: Steve Hind (University of Sydney)

Melbourne Invitationals

Host: University of Melbourne, Australia
Champions: University of Sydney (Phillip Senior & Bradley Lancken)
Runners Up: University of Melbourne/Monash University (Elizabeth Sheargold & Fiona Prowse)
Monash University (Kylie Lane & Jacob Clifton)
University of Melbourne/Independent (Seamus Coleman & Michael Smith)
Best Speaker: Elizabeth Sheargold (University of Melbourne) and Phil Senior (Independent)

Australian British Parliamentary Championships

Host: University of Sydney, Australia
Champions: University of New South Wales A (Alexandra Grey & Gillian White)
Runners Up: University of Sydney A (Christopher Croke & Phillip Senior)
University of Sydney B (Bradley Lancken & Hamish White)
University of Melbourne A (Elizabeth Sheargold & Daniel Kinsey)
Best Speaker: Phillip Senior (Independent)

CUSID National Championships

Host: Carleton University, Canada
Champions: Hart House, University of Toronto (Gaurav Toshniwal & Ian Freeman)
Runners Up: McGill University (Jess Prince & Gordon Shotwell)
Best Speaker: Laura Kusisto (Queen's University)
Novice Champion: Hart House, University of Toronto (Richard Lizius & Alexander Levy)
Best Novice Speaker: Richard Lizius (Hart House, University of Toronto)

CUSID British Parliamentary Championships

- Host: University of British Columbia, Canada
- Champions: Hart House, University of Toronto MT (Gaurav Toshniwal & Rory McKeown)
- Runners Up: University of Calgary (Monica Ferris & Brent Kettles)
Hart House, University of Toronto RA (Rahool Agarwal & James Renihan)
Hart House, University of Toronto NK (Joanna Nairn and Michael Kotrly)
- Best Speaker: James Renihan (Hart House, University of Toronto)

7th JPDU Tournament

- Hosts: Tokyo Women's Christian University & Yokohama City University, Japan
- Champions: Osaka Prefecture University A (Koji Sobata & Shoko Kaneta)
- Runners Up: International Christian University B (Akira Koubara & Hisashi Okuda)
International Christian University A (Manabu Igusa & Dai Oba)
Tsuda University A (Naoko Tsuchihashi & Chisa Uekama)
- Best Speaker: Yusuke Mizuno (Seikei University)

The 8th JPDU Tournament

- Hosts: Tokyo Women's Christian University & Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
- Champion: International Christian University C (Dai Oba & Hisashi Okuda)
- Runners Up: International Christian University B (Akira Koubara & Manabu Igusa)
Keio University A (Yusuke Nakazawa & Shunichi Takei)
Kyoto University B (Machi Miyata & Hiroyuki Kato)
- Best Speaker: Miki Kawaguchi (University of Kitakyushu)

Korea Intervarsity Debate Championships

- Host: Chung Ang University, Korea
- Champions: Ewha Woman's University A (Lin Kamaruddin, Hea Eum Cho & Ji Eun Song)
- Runners up: Ewha Woman's University B (Reela Khalifa, Wendie Kim & Ah Young Kim)
- Best speaker: Lin Kamaruddin (Ewha Woman's University)

Royal Malaysian Intervarsity Debating Championships

- Host: National University of Malaysia
- Champions: UT MARA (Danial Amir, Iqbal Hafiedz & Mohd Faiz)
- Runners Up: International Islamic University (Asrul Izzam, Irma Nurzahrah, Sarah Chinoy & Mohd Shoaib)
- Best Speaker: Danial Amir (UT MARA)

RESULTS

Second National Health Sciences Debate

Host: International Medical University, Malaysia
Champions: National University Of Malaysia (Tan Ai Huey & Khor Swee Kheng)
1st Runners Up: UT MARA (Danial Amir & Afiq Nasir)
2nd Runners Up: University of Malaya (Sheena Babu & Mohd Razif Nasardin)
Finalists: Multimedia University (Ng Eu Jin & Shoaib Rahim)

Officers Cup, New Zealand Impromptu Debating Championships

Host: Auckland University, New Zealand
Champions: Victoria University of Wellington A (Christopher Bishop & Joe Connell)
Runners Up: Otago University A (Marcelo Rodriguez-Ferrere & Laura Fraser)
Best Speaker: Laura Fraser (Otago University)

Joynt Scroll, New Zealand Prepared Debating Championships

Host: Otago University, New Zealand
Winners: Auckland University A (Paul Paterson, Jonathan Orpin & Jordan Ward)
Runners Up: Otago University A (Torie Olds, Renee Heal & Laura Fraser)
Best Speaker: Jonathan Orpin (Auckland University)

Victoria Open Intervarsity

Host: Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Champions: Victoria University of Wellington (Christopher Bishop & Gareth Richards)
Best Speaker: Sayeqa Islam (Victoria University of Wellington)
Best Novice: Robbie Allan (University of Canterbury)

National Filipino Debate Championships

Host: Siliman University, Dumaguete City, Philippines
Champions: Ateneo de Manila University B (Charisse Borrromeo & Sharmila Parmanand)
Runners Up: Ateneo de Manila University A (Lisandro Claudio & Glenn Tuazon)
University of Philippines Manila (Yves Aquino & Adrian Rabe)
University of Philippines Manila (Chrysanthus Herrera & Karen Supnad)
Best Speaker: Glenn Tuazon (Ateneo de Manila University)

The Dorothy Cheung Inter Tertiary Debating Championships

Host: Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Champions: Nanyang Technological University A (Varun Prakash, Ajay Andrews & Sushil Sriram)
Runners Up: Nanyang Technological University C (Sandhya Tiwari, Utkarsh Bahadur, Priyanka Ganjoo)
Best Speaker: Varun Prakash (Nanyang Technological University)

SMU Hammers Debating Championships

Host: Singapore Management University, Singapore
 Champions: Nanyang Technological University A (Varun Prakash, Anirudh Baliga, Vikram Balasubramanian)
 Runners Up: Singapore Management University A (Pang Keep Ying Joey, Alvin Amadeo Witirto and Bhavya Khanna)
 Best Speaker: Pang Keep Ying Joey (Singapore Management University)

2nd EU-TU National Intervarsity Debating Championships

Host: Thammasat University, Thailand
 Champions: Thammasat University A (Praewta Sorasuchart, Aekaraj Guruvanich, Pachara Yongjiranon)
 Runners Up: Assumption University B (Ng Shee Zher, Rut Charaslertrangsi, Thepparith Senamngern)
 Best Speaker: Praewta Sorasuchart (Thammasat University)

South African National Debating Championships

Host: University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa
 Champions: University of the Witwatersrand (David Fowkes and James Fowkes)
 Best Speaker: David Simonsz (University of Cape Town)
 ESL Champions: Rhodes University (Anele Makhwaza & Londa Nxumalo)